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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS
IN PUBLIC SCHOOL ADMISSIONS
Kevin Broivn
I. INTRODUCTION
Driven by federal court decrees, political beliefs that an integrated
society was a better one, and educational policy decisions fostering
multiculturalism, many public elementary and secondary schools
instituted voluntary measures to produce integrated student bodies. State
or local school officials take account of race and ethnicity in order to
promote voluntary integration of their student bodies. A number of
federal courts, however, have recently addressed equal protection
challenges to the use of racial classifications of students to foster
voluntary integration. ' For purposes of the Equal Protection Clause,
* Charles Whistler Professor of Law. Indiana University School of Law. B.S., 1978. Indiana
University; J.D., 1982, Yale University. The Author would like to thank the participants at %arious
presentations for their helpful comments, and the students in his Spring 2000 "Race, Amzrican
Society and the Law" class for their assistance in the preparation of this Article. Finally, the Author
would like to ackmowledge Deborah Eads for her secretarial assistance with this Article.
An earlier version of this Article was delivered in March 2000 as a -T-ch at a
Symposium at University of Akron School of Law. The Symposium is entitled Education and the
Constitution: Shaping Each Other and the Next Century, and the Essay corrfe-onding to the T--cch
is published in the Akron Law Review. See Kevin Brown, Equal Protection Challenges to the Use
of Racial Classifications to Promote Integrated Public Elementary and Secondary Student
Enrollments, 34 AKRON L. REV. 37 (2000).
1. See, e.g., Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738.750-53 (2d Cir. 2000);
Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 125, 127 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied
sub nom. 120 S. Ct. 1420 (U.S. 2000); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698.700.704
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these courts could rely on Supreme Court school desegregation
jurisprudence holding that school officials have broad powers to foster
integration. These courts analyzed the constitutionality of using racial
classifications by applying strict scrutiny. Yet, their analysis has seldom
taken into account the special environment of public education! Thus,
there is little difference between the way these courts have generally
dealt with the use of racial classifications of students from governmental
use of racial classifications outside of public education. Most of the
court decisions concluded that the state or local school officials failed
either to articulate a compelling state interest to justify their admissions
policies or that the policies were not narrowly tailored. Since effective
integration of student bodies probably requires the use of racial
classifications, the decisions by these federal courts suggest that the
ability of public schools to foster voluntary integration of student bodies
is extremely limited.
A number of Supreme Court opinions have recognized that
constitutional rights applied in the context of public education must be
adapted to the special nature of public education. The recent decisions
have pointed to the need to distinguish two different jurisprudential
paths spawned by the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education3 and its school desegregation progeny. The Supreme Court's
decision in Brown dealt with the application of the Equal Protection
Clause in the context of public education. The Supreme Court quickly
followed its decision in Brown with a number of cases striking down
segregation by government in other fields.' Thus, Brown was the case
(4th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (U.S. 2000); Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1999); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 793-94,
800 (1st Cir. 1998). while this Article will not address these cases separately in this Part, district
courts in Kentucky, Ohio, and North Carolina have also addressed this issue. See Hampton v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 379-82 (w.D. Ky. 2000); Capacchione v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228, 232, 242 (W.D.N.C. 1999); Equal Open
Enrollment Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 937 F. Supp. 700, 701,710 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
2. But see, e.g., McLaughlin ex rel McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 938 F. Supp. 1001,
1015 (D. Mass. 1996).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. See id. at 495.
5. See Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (per curiam) (striking down segregation
in courtrooms); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 351, 354 (1962) (per curiam) (striking
down segregation in municipal airports); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege,
252 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1958) (per curiam), aff'd, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (striking
down segregation in public parks); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1955),
vacated by 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (striking down segregation on golf courses); Dawson
v. Mayor of Batt., 220 F.2d 386, 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (per curiam), aff'd, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per
curiam) (striking down segregation on beaches); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 710-11, 717
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that is generally credited with sparking the Supreme Court's equal
protection jurisprudence. Over the past forty-five years, the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence has developed considerably. The Court
has gone on to resolve a number of major equal protection issues in
cases such as Washington v. Davis,6 Village of Arlington Heights v
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,7 Regents of University of
California v. Bakke,8 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.," Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,'o and Miller v. Johnson."
But there was another road that led from the Supreme Court's
opinion in Brown. For as the Court stated in Brown:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of
the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
hinz to adjust normally to his environzent.'2
This second path leading from Brown is the Court's jurisprudence
in the field of public education. Since Brown, not only has the Supreme
Court's equal protection jurisprudence developed, but so has its public
education jurisprudence. Since Brown, the Supreme Court opinions have
recognized that constitutional rights must be adapted to the special
nature of public elementary and secondary education. The Supreme
Court has articulated different tests to determine violations of students'
free speech rights under the First Amendment"s and privacy rights under
the Fourth Amendment14 from those that are applied outside of the
context of public education. Even though the Court recognized that
(MD. Ala. 1956), aff'd sub nom. 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (par curiam) (striking down segregation in
transportation).
6. 426 U.S. 229,232,239 (1976) (analyzing police application testsI.
7. 429 U.S. 252,254 (1977) (analyzing rezoning).
8. 438 U.S. 265,269-70 (1978) (analyzing a medical school's admission plan).
9. 488 U.S. 469,476-77 (1989) (analyzing local government contracts).
10. 515 U.S. 200,204 (1995) (analyzing government contracts).
11. 515 U.S. 900,903-04 (1995) (analyzing a state redistricting plan).
12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483.493 (1954) (emphasis added).
13. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260.272-73 11938); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503,511 (1969).
14. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995). New Jersey v. TJLO.,
469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
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students possess a state-created property interest in public education
which is protected by the Due Process Clause, the Court has interpreted
the requirements for a due process hearing to be minimal when school
officials seek to suspend students from public schools for less than ten
days. The Supreme Court has often applied the test in Lemon v.
Kurtzman 5 to resolve Establishment Clause challenges to governmental
actions. The first three times that the Court struck down governmental
actions relying solely on the purpose prong of the Lemon test were
related to disputes about public education. 16 The Supreme Court has also
determined that in light of the special characteristics of the public school
environment, the right to receive information-which "is an inherent
corollary of the rights of free speech and press"--is also applied
differently.' 7 Even the equal protection rights of resident aliens who seek
employment as public school teachers are determined differently from
how they are determined for most other governmental occupations. 8
While the students do not leave "their constitutional rights ... at
the schoolhouse gate,' 9 they clearly change into a different set of
constitutional clothing. The special environment of public education
comes from the fact that the objectives of public education are the
"inculcati[on of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system."' Public education is the one governmental
service for the selective conveyances of ideas to the young. The
Supreme Court based its decision to vary constitutional rights on three
overlapping concerns involving public elementary and secondary
education that do not normally exist outside of the educational context.
First, when addressing constitutional rights of students, the Court is
dealing with the rights of minors. The Court has noted in a number of
decisions that the rights of minors are different from adults. Second, the
Supreme Court has recognized that for public schools to effectively
teach the lessons that students must learn, it is necessary that they be
able to maintain appropriate discipline. Third, the Court has recognized
15. 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971).
16. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 581, 583, 585, 612 (1987) (striking down a
statute requiring teachers to teach creation science whenever they taught the theory of evolution);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-56 (1985) (striking down an Alabama statute authorizing a one
minute period of silence for meditation or prayer); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per
curiam) (striking down a statute providing for posting of the Ten Commandments, paid for by
private funds, on the walls of each public classroom in Kentucky).
17. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico ex rel. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-68 (1982).
18. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979).
19. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,506 (1969).
20. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 77.
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that the primary purpose of public education is the inculcation of
fundamental values necessary for the maintenance of our democratic
society. Therefore, in determining the application of constitutional rights
in public schools, the values being socialized are of utmost concern.
While the issue of the use of racial classifications in public schools'
admissions policies could be interpreted within the confines of the
Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, that is not the only road
that leads from Brown. The use of racial classifications could also be
interpreted against the background of the Supreme Court's public
education jurisprudence. In this Article, I will argue that the recent lower
federal court decisions addressing equal protection challenges to the use
of racial classifications in public elementary and secondary education
have not paid adequate attention to the Supreme Court cases in the field
of education. It is a mistake to examine the use of racial classifications in
public schools in the same way this issue would be analyzed outside the
context of public education. When a court addresses equal protection
challenges to the use of racial classifications of public school students,
its application of strict scrutiny should focus on the messages conveyed
by the use of such classifications. In other words, public schools have a
compelling state interest in inculcating the values derived from the
Equal Protection Clause. The basic value is the importance of treating
everyone as an individual. As long as the use of racial classifications to
bring about integrated student bodies furthers the internalization of the
importance of treating all as individuals, then their use is narrowly
tailored to that compelling interest. While it is true that the use of racial
classifications sends a message that race does matter, integrated
education is much more likely to facilitate students learning to treat
everyone as an individual than racially neutral means that fail to produce
integrated student bodies.
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of the
power of states and local school officials to take account of race and
ethnicity to further integrated public education in a context without an
allegation of de jure segregation. This issue, however, was always in the
background of the Supreme Court's school desegregation
jurisprudence.2' Part II revisits the Supreme Court's school
desegregation jurisprudence. The Supreme Court's school desegregation
jurisprudence assumed that state and local school officials could go
further in terms of desegregating their public schools than the federal
courts could order. The principle that limited the power of federal courts
21. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1. 16(1971 ).
2000]
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enacting and approving school desegregation decrees was "that the
scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the
constitutional violation." But this limitation did not apply to state and
local school officials.23 Part II concludes by focusing on earlier lower
court decisions addressing equal protection challenges to the use of
racial classifications. These cases involved situations where schools
were trying to dismantle de facto-as opposed to de jure-segregation.
These lower courts accepted the fact that school officials had broad
powers to take account of race and ethnicity in order to foster integration
of their student bodies as well as their faculties. Thus, they consistently
rejected equal protection challenges by those affected by the use of
racial classifications to these integration measures.
The First, Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have recently
addressed equal protection challenges to the use of racial classifications
in admissions of students to public elementary and secondary schools.
Part III discusses these cases to reveal the typical analysis applied to this
issue by recent lower federal court decisions. This Part shows that these
courts have generally neither recognized the broad power invested in
school officials by the Supreme Court's school desegregation
jurisprudence nor taken into account the socializing aspect of public
education. These courts have consistently treated these cases the same as
cases involving the use of racial classifications by government in a non-
public education context.
Part IV discusses Supreme Court cases applying constitutional
provisions to the public education context. From these cases it is clear
that the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the constitutional
rights of public school students in light of the special environment of
public schools.
Part V argues that the constitutional analysis of the use of racial
classifications to further integrated student bodies should take account of
the special environment of public schools. The special mission of public
schools is value inculcation of the young. Thus, the central question
invoked by the use of racial classifications to foster integrated student
bodies is: What messages are being sent? The messages indicate the
values being inculcated by public schools' use of racial classifications to
promote integration.
Given recent Supreme Court decisions, the fundamental value
derived from the Equal Protection Clause is the belief in treating people
22. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,744 (1974).
23. See id.
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as individuals and not as components of a racial or ethnic group. When
public schools use racial classifications in order to foster an integrated
student body, they send mixed messages. On the one hand, the
classification itself sends the message that students should be considered
members of racial and ethnic groups. On the other hand, the mixing of
the students in the schools by racial and ethnic groups and other
attendant circumstances can also send messages that the mixing is for
the purpose of bringing them together, so that they come to see each
other as individuals and not as components of racial or ethnic groups. As
Justice Blackmun noted in his opinion in Regents of University of
Califonzia v. Bakke,24 "[in order to get beyond racism, we must first
take account of race."' s This applies with special force in public
education because its primary purpose is "inculcating fundamental
values" to the young.26 Considering all relevant circumstances, the use of
racial classifications to further integrate student bodies is consistent with
the Equal Protection Clause if the message conveyed is that people
should be treated as individuals and not as members of racial or ethnic
groups.
IX. OPINIONS INDICATING THAT STATES AND SCHOOL OFFICIALS
HAVE BROAD POWERS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF RACE AND
ETHNICITY TO MAINTAIN INTEGRATED SCHOOLS
The Supreme Court has not directly confronted the questions of
whether and to what extent public schools can take account of race and
ethnicity to foster an integrated student body in a context lacking an
allegation of de jure segregation. Nevertheless, the issue was always in
the background of the Supreme Court's school desegregation
jurisprudence. The Court's school desegregation jurisprudence assumed
that state and local school officials could go further in terms of
desegregating their public schools than federal courts could order in
response to an equal protection violation. The following principle
limited the power of federal courts enacting and approving school
desegregation decrees. "[T]he scope of the[ir] remedy [was] determined
by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation."' 7 But this
limiting principle did not apply to state and local school officials"
24. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
25. Id. at 407.
26. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,77 (1979).
27. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744.
28. See id.
2000)
HOFSTRA LA IV REVIEW
A. The Supreme Court's School Desegregation Jurisprudence
The 1971 landmark opinion, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education,29 is the most direct statement from the Supreme
Court recognizing that school officials had broad powers to maintain
integrated student bodies, while the remedial power of the federal courts
was limited.? Chief Justice Burger's unanimous opinion for the Court
set out the guidelines for integrating schools, including approving busing
as a tool to further that end." Burger noted that a low percentage of
minority students in a particular school does not necessarily betoken
unconstitutional conduct, but may result from innocent causes3--- for
example, the population distribution of a given district. He warned
federal courts that, unless a skewed enrollment pattern is caused by
unconstitutional student assignment practices, federal courts must defer
to school officials' discretion and refrain from imposing remedies."3
Burger noted that the remedial power of federal courts extends only
on the basis of a constitutional violation.' This authority, however,
"does not put judges automatically in the shoes of school authorities
whose powers are plenary."3 He continued:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to
formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude,
for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic
society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white
students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this
as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of
school authorities .... 36
The Supreme Court's opinion in Washington v. Seattle School
District No. 137 also assumed that the power of states and local school
boards to use racial classifications to foster integrated student bodies is
broad.3" The Seattle School District adopted a resolution intended to
eliminate racially imbalanced schools.39 There was no allegation of de
29. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
30. See id. at 16.
31. See id. at 29-31.
32. See id. at 26.
33. See id. at 16.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
38. See id. at 479-80.
39. See id. at 460.
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jure segregation. At the time "[a]bout 37% of thel] children [attending
Seattle public schools] [we]re of Negro, Asian, American Indian, or
Hispanic ancestry."40 According to the resolution, schools were
considered to be racially imbalanced if "'the combined minority student
enrollment in a school exceeds the districtwide combined average by 20
percentage points."' 4' No school, however, was to have a majority of
members from a single minority group. 2 To eliminate racially
imbalanced schools, the District concluded that it was necessary to
engage in "mandatory reassignment of students." 3 The desegregation
plan adopted was first implemented for the 1978-79 academic year.
The plan eliminated many neighborhood schools, however, its
implementation did 'substantially reduce[] the number of racially
imbalanced schools in the district.'... It also 'substantially reduced the
percentage of minority students in those schools which remain[ed]
racially imbalanced."'' 6 Even if the school and state officials had
intentionally caused the segregation, the plan went "substantially
beyond" the remedial requirements under the Equal Protection Clause.S
In late 1977, opponents of desegregation drafted a statewide ballot
initiative, known as Initiative 350.43 Initiative 350 was "designed to
terminate the use of mandatory busing for purposes of racial
integration."4'9 Absent certain special exceptions enumerated therein, it
generally required .'student[s] to attend a school ... geographically
nearest or next nearest the student's place of residence."'" Two months
after the District's desegregation plan went into effect, almost sixty-six
percent of the voters approved Intiative 350 on November 8, 1978."
Within a month, the District, along with two other school districts that
had implemented desegregation plans, filed suit "challenging the
40. Id. at 459-60.
41. Id. at 460 (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 473 F. Supp. 996, 1006 (W.D.
Wash. 1979)).
42. See id.
43. Id. at 461.
44. See id.
45. Id. (quoting Seattle ScL Dist. No. 1, 473 F. Supp. at 1007).
46. Id. (quoting Seattle ScIL Dist. No. 1, 473 F. Supp. at 1007).
47. See Arval A. Morris, hither the Neighborhood School?-Comments on Washington v.
Seattle School District and Crawford v. Board of Education, 6 EDI'C. L REP. 429,435 (1933).
48. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 462.
49. Id. (footnote omitted).
50. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.26.010 (1981)).
51. See id.at463.
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constitutionality of Initiative 350 under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." 52
The Supreme Court held that Initiative 350 violated the Equal
Protection Clause.53 The Court noted that Initiative 350 removed from
the local school board only the power to assign students to schools based
on race, stating:
[T]he power to determine what programs would most appropriately fill
a school district's educational needs-including programs involving
student assignment and desegregation-was firmly committed to the
local board's discretion. The question whether to provide an integrated
learning environment rather than a system of neighborhood schools
surely involved a decision of that sort.-
Thus, the Court left Seattle with a school desegregation program
that exceeded that which could be ordered by federal district courts, even
if it was necessary to remedy an equal protection violation.5
Two other opinions by individual members of the Supreme Court
are also worth mentioning. Justice Powell dissented from the Supreme
Court's opinion in two companion cases decided in 1979, Columbus
Board of Education v. Penick56 and Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman.5 7 These opinions were written the following year after his
52. Id. at 464.
53. See id. at 470.
54. Id. at 479-80.
55. See Morris, supra note 47, at 435. In other cases, the Supreme Court made it clear that the
powers of the federal courts to construct a remedy for a de jure segregation violation limited the
scope of the remedy. For example, in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the Supreme Court
rejected a multi-district desegregation plan imposed on the City of Detroit and fifty-three of its
surrounding suburbs. See id. at 752-53. The district court ruled that it was necessary to include the
predominantly white suburban school systems in order for any desegregation to occur. See id. at
732-33. The district court based this plan on Michigan's general responsibility and authority to
supervise public education in both the City of Detroit and the suburbs, stating that "Michigan had
committed several constitutional violations with respect to" school desegregation. Id. at 726. The
Supreme Court reversed the district court and rejected the inclusion of the suburban school districts
in the desegregation plan, holding that absent a showing that a constitutional violation in one district
produced a significant segregative effect in another, there was no justification for cross-district
remedies. See id. at 745. The Court stated that the remedy must be limited to Detroit itself because
the record in this case showed that only one city, not the suburban school districts, committed
significant constitutional violations. See id.; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248
(1991) (noting that desegregation orders were intended as temporary measures that remedy past
discrimination); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1976) (limiting the
ability of federal courts to order annual adjustment to school desegregation decree in order to ensure
that no school ever had a majority of minority students, because such a remedial order was not
responding to the constitutional violation).
56. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
57. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
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opinion applying strict scrutiny to medical school admissions in Regents
of University of Califonzia v. Bakke.!' Powell primarily criticized what
he saw as an unwarranted expansion of federal judicial involvement in
the operation of public schools some twenty-five years after the Court's
opinion in Brown. He took this opportunity to criticize federal courts
for prescribing mandatory measures to desegregate student bodies as the
constitutionally required remedy.O Justice Powell stated that the
mandatory desegregation measures were problematic because experience
in city after city showed that resegregation was stimulated by the
resentment of both parents and students of the judicial concern embodied
in desegregation decrees.6' Powell went on to note:
The ultimate goal is to have quality school systems in which racial
discrimination is neither practiced nor tolerated. It has been thought
that ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom is a desirable
component of sound education in our country of diverse populations, a
58. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
59. Part of Justice Powell's criticism was aimed at the belief that there %as inadequate
evidence that the segregation in these cases was the result of discriminatory purposes by state
officials. See Penick, 443 U.S. at 480 (Powell, J., dissenting). Poeell noted that the condition of
segregated schools in these cities "results primarily from familiar segregated housing patterns,
which-in turn-are caused by social, economic, and demographic forces for xhich no cheol
board is responsible." Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell criticized holding the school boards of
these two cities responsible for all of the segregation that had occurred in each of the cities' schools,
as opposed to attributing it to factors that vere beyond the control of the school officials. See id. at
480-81 (Povell, J., dissenting).
60. See hU. at 487 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that "restructuring and overseeing the
operation of major public school systems-as ordered in these cases-fairly can be %iesed as social
engineering that hardly is appropriate for the federal judiciary"). Justice Powvell also joined the
separate dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist, who noted that:
The school desegregation remedy imposed on the Columbus school system by this
Court's affirmance of the Court of Appeals is as complete and dramatic a displacement
of local authority by the federal judiciary as is possible in our federal system .... 4200
of the system's 96,000 students are [being] reassigned to new schools.
I at 489 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. In his dissent, Justice Powell stated-
This wholesale substitution of judicial legislation for the judgments of elected officials
and professional educators derogates the entire process of public education. Morco% er, it
constitutes a serious interference with the private decisions of parents as to how their
children will be educated. These harmful consequences are the inevitable byproducts of a
judicial approach that ignores other relevant factors in favor of an exclusive focus on
racial balance in every school.
These harmful consequences, moreover, in all likelihood ,ill provoke responses that
will defeat the integrative purpose of the courts' orders. Parents. unlike school officials,
are not bound by these decrees and may frustrate them through the simple expedient of
withdrawing their children from a public school system in uhich they ha%e lost
confidence.
Id. at 483-84 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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view to which I subscribe. The question that courts in their single-
minded pursuit of racial balance seem to ignore is how best to move
toward this goal.62
Powell then praised voluntary majority to minority transfer programs,
and specifically noted a Wisconsin statute that implemented such a
program:
63
Wisconsin ha[d] implemented a system of subsidized, voluntary, intra-
and inter-district majority-to-minority transfers. It is too early to
determine whether this experiment will attain its objective of
encouraging substantial integration. But it is the sort of effort that
should be considered by state and local officials and elected bodies.
The contrast between the underlying philosophy of the Wisconsin plan
and the massive coercion undertaken by the courts below is striking."
Even Justice Rehnquist, in a 1978 opinion, accepted the fact that
states could engage in broad measures to integrate student bodies. In
Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education,6 Rehnquist denied an application for
a stay, filed by Bustop, Inc., of an order issued by the California
Supreme Court.6 Bustop, Inc., supported by the Attorney General of
California, sought to delay the implementation of the order pending the
filing of a petition for certiorari or an appeal to the United States
Supreme Court.6 The California Supreme Court's "order vacated a ...
stay issued by the California Court of Appeal, which had in turn stayed
the enforcement of a school desegregation order issued by the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County. ' ' 3 The desegregation order issued by the
Superior Court required the reassignment of over 60,000 students in Los
Angeles public schools.69 The goal of the desegregation order was "to
insure that all schools in the Los Angeles Unified School District ha[d]
Anglo and minority percentages between 70% and 30%."7 The plan thus
required extensive reassignment and transportation of students.7
62. Id. at 486 (Powell, J., dissenting).
63. See id. at 488,488 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 488 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Willan v. Menomonee
Falls Sch. Bd., 658 F. Supp. 1416, 1424 (E.D. Wis. 1987) (applying Powell's dissent in Penick to
uphold a challenge to the application of Wisconsin law).
65. 439 U.S. 1380 (1978).
66. See id. at 1383.
67. See id. at 1380.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 1381.
71. See id. at 1380.
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Bustop, Inc. argued on behalf of students to be transported that the
desegregation order was at odds with the Supreme Court's school
desegregation jurisprudence.' In rejecting the application for the stay,
Rehnquist noted that if the desegregation plan had been premised on a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, then he would be inclined to
agree with Bustop, Inc. that the remedial order was inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's school desegregation decisions?" But Rehnquist noted
that the earlier opinions of the California Supreme Court in this case, 4
rested on their interpretation of the California State Constitution." Those
opinions concluded that proponents seeking a court-ordered busing
decree were required to show less than the United States Supreme Court
has required for those "seek[ing] similar relief under the United States
Constitution."
7 6
Rehnquist went on to distinguish this case from his recent decision
to stay the judgment and order of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in another case." He noted:
[Tihe only authority that a federal court has to order desegregation or
busing in a local school district arises from the United States
Constitution. But the same is not true of state courts. So far as [the
United States Supreme] Court is concerned, [state courts] are free to
interpret the Constitution of the State to impose more stringent
restrictions on the operation of a local school board."
In conclusion, Rehnquist stated that Bustop, Inc. phrased its contention
in the following way:
"Unlike desegregation cases coming to this Court through the lower
federal courts, of which there must be hundreds, if not thousands, here
the issue is novel. The issue: May California in an attempt to racially
balance schools use its doctrne of independent state grounds to ignore
the federal rights of its citizens to be free from racial quotas and to be
free from extensive pupil transportation that destroys fundamental
rights of liberty and privacy.""
72. Seeid. at1381.
73. See id.
74. See Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976); Jackson v. Pas.dAna City Sch.
Dist., 382 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1963).
75. SeeBustop, Inc., 439 U.S. at 1381.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1382 (citing Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick. 439 U.S. 1348 (1978)).
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Appliecation for Stay 16.11).
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In response, Rehnquist pointed out that the novel aspect of Bustop,
Inc.'s contention is the following argument:
[E]ach citizen of a State who is either a parent or a schoolchild has a
"federal right" to be "free from racial quotas and to be free from
extensive pupil transportation that destroys fundamental rights of
liberty and privacy." While I have the gravest doubts that the Supreme
Court of California was required by the United States Constitution to
take the action that it has taken in this case, I have very little doubt that
it was permitted by that Constitution to take such action."
As the above discussion shows, the Supreme Court's school
desegregation jurisprudence made it clear that the power of federal
courts to order racial balancing was limited to the requirement to
respond to a constitutional violation."' State and local school officials,
however, appear to have broader powers to engage in efforts to integrate
their student bodies than the federal courts.82 Thus, the Court accepted
that state and local school officials could use racial classifications in
order to foster integrated student bodies. 3 The Court's school
desegregation cases would approve of the use of racial classifications to
80. Id. at 1383 (quoting Application for Stay 16.11).
81. In United States v. City of Yonkers, 197 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
2005 (U.S. 2000), the Second Circuit summarized the three principles guiding the Supreme Court's
school desegregation jurisprudence. See id. at 55.
First, "the nature of the desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and
scope of the constitutional violation." Second, the desegregation decree "must indeed be
remedial in nature, that is, it must be designed as nearly as possible 'to restore the
victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the
absence of such conduct."' Finally, the court "must take into account the interests of
state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the
Constitution."
Id. (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977)) (citations omitted). Other Supreme
Court cases have also "firmly recognized that local autonomy of school districts is a vital national
tradition." Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977); see, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (noting that desegregation orders were intended as temporary
measures to remedy past discrimination); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) (noting that
"federal-court decrees must directly address and relate the constitutional violation itself"); Pasadena
City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 (1976) (limiting the ability of federal courts to
order annual adjustment to school desegregation decree in order to ensure that no school ever had a
majority of minority students, because such a remedial order was not responding to the
constitutional violation); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) (noting the deeply
rooted tradition of local autonomy in public education); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 50 (1973) (noting that "mlo area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity
of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches than does public education"); Wright v. Council of
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 469 (1972) (describing local, direct control over education in Emporia,
Virginia).
82. See Bustop, Inc., 439 U.S. at 1382.
83. See id. at 1383.
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foster racially and ethnically diverse student bodies to eliminate racial
isolation or to alleviate de facto segregation.
B. Decisions by Federal and State Courts Recognizing Broad
Discretion of School Qfficials to Use Racial
Classifications to Maintain Integrated Student Bodies
Until recently, federal and state courts that addressed the issue of
using racial classifications to foster an integrated student body took their
lead from the Supreme Court's school desegregation jurisprudence.
These courts recognized that school districts possessed broad powers to
implement measures to integrate their student bodies and faculties."
They viewed the desire to end de facto segregation to provide an
adequate justification for integration.
In Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach the
Second Circuit addressed a challenge raised by minority students to a
desegregation plan for Andrew Jackson High School in Queens, New
York.8 Jackson High School had gone in 1957 from a school that was
82% white to one that was less than 1% white in 1976." During the
1960s, the Board of Education of the City of New York adopted a
succession of plans to stem the acceleration of Jackson High School to
"an exclusively minority student" population 28
In 1973, the Board finally abandoned the hope of maintaining
integration at Jackson High School and instead adopted a "Choice of
Admissions" scheme." By late 1977, the high school student population
in the borough of Queens had fallen to only 48% white and was
predicted to decline to only about 36% white in 1981. 9 Under the plan,
"minority students in the Jackson [High School attendance] zone had the
choice of attending any of a number of receiving [high] schools at which
the minority population was lower than at Jackson, and the influx of
additional minority students would not destroy whatever racial balance
84. See, e.g., Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ., 742 F. Supp. 1275, 1301 (D. Md. 1990) 6justifying the
efforts to maintain integrated faculty assignments). "It is well-settled in federal law that state and
local school authorities may voluntarily adopt plans to promote integration even in the absence of a
specific finding of past discrimination." Willan v. Menomonee Falls Seh. Bd., 658 F. Supp. 1416.
1422 (E.D. Wis. 1987).
85. 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979) [hereinafter Andrew Jackson I].
86. Seeid.at708.
87. See Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach. 738 F.2d 574, 576 f2d Cir.
1984) [hereinafter Andrew Jackson 11].
88. Andrew Jackson 1,598 F.2d at 710.
89. Andreir Jackson II, 738 F.2d at 576.
90. See Andrew Jackson l,598 F.2d at 710.
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currently existed" in the receiving schools.9' Revisions were made to the
plan in 1975 and 1976, which led to the adoption of the scheme known
as the "1976 Controlled Rate of Change Plan,"' which sought:
to balance the goal of placing Jackson's minority students in integrated
schools of their choice, against the perceived reality that if the minority
enrollment in an individual receiving school [either] increased too
rapidly or reached a critical absolute level .... white students would
leave the receiving school at an increasing rate.
The Board determined that the "tipping point" occurred when the
percentage of white students dropped below 50%.94 "By controlling both
the rate and extent of change in racial composition in the receiving
schools, the Board hoped gradually to transfer most or all of the student
population out of segregated Jackson [attendance zone area], without at
the same time triggering resegregation of currently integrated receiving
schools."95 Thus, the Board sought to provide the maximum amount of
integrated education over the longest period of time for the largest
number of students.96
White enrollment in the system as a whole was inadequate to keep
all schools above the tipping point.9 Thus, the impact of the limitations
on student choice placed on the ability of students in the Jackson High
School attendance zone to transfer to other schools meant that some
minority children would not be able to attend integrated schools.9 In
effect, one group of minority students could be kept in stable integrated
schools only by requiring another group of minority students-those in
91. Andrew Jackson II, 738 F.2d at 576.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 576-77. Under the plan:
Black and Hispanic students ... could elect to attend any New York City high school not
already overenrolled, in which (1) the percentage of white students in the school exceeds
either 50% of the school population or the borough-wide average in the borough in
which the receiving school is located (whichever is higher); provided further that (2) the
admission of such students, coupled with the admission of minority students from other
integration programs and/or through demographic changes in the attendance area
servicing the school, will not (a) decrease the receiving facility's white/minority ethnic
balance by 4% or more in any one school year, or (b) produce a rate of change in any
one year that exceeds one-fourth of the difference between the school's current white
enrollment and a 50% white enrollment, whichever is less.
Id.
95. Id. at 576.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 577.
98. See Andrew Jackson 1, 598 F.2d 705,718 (2d Cir. 1979).
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the Jackson High School attendance zone--to remain in predominantly
minority schools.9
In June, 1976, a class action was filed on behalf of students and
parents in the Jackson attendance school zone.' O° They sought to
challenge the constitutionality of the Plan arguing that the "imposition of
a racial quota against the admission of minority students to potential
receiving schools violated the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]Iause."' O't The
district court found that the segregation in Jackson High School
attendance zone was de facto segregation, resulting from changes in
population, and not de jure segregation.' " Nevertheless, it agreed with
the plaintiffs that the Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause.- In
striking down the Plan, the district court "acknowledgted] that the
Board's goals in adopting the Plan were benign."' The district court
concluded, however, "that by 'limit[ing] minority pupils' access to
schools because of their minority status in order to provide integrated
schooling for as long as possible to a progressively limited number of
minority and other students,' ... impermissibly recreated 'a dual school
system' of integrated and segregated schools."'""
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court finding
that the segregation in the Jackson High School attendance zone resulted
from changes in population and not the result of governmental action."t
Given the absence of de jure segregation there was no constitutionally
required obligation to order desegregation!"' The Second Circuit then
went on to address the equal protection challenge to the Plan."
Applying strict scrutiny, the Second Circuit found that the Plan's aim to
promote a more lasting integration to be "a sufficiently compelling
purpose to justify [as a matter of law] excluding some minority students
from schools of their choice under the obviously race-conscious ...
Plan. ''""n The Court remanded the case to the district court for several
factual determinations concerning specific provisions of the Plan.110
99. See id.
100. See Andrew Jackson II, 738 F.2d at 577.
101. Id.
102. See Andrew Jackson 1, 598 F.2d at 709.
103. See Andrew Jackson II, 738 F.2d at 577.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Arnbach. 451 F. Supp. 1056,
1080-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)) (first alteration in original).
106. See Andrew Jackson 1,598 F.2d at 709.
107. See ik
108. Seei. at717.
109. Id. at 719.
110. On remand, the district court was to address:
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In Willan v. Menomonee Falls School Board,"' a minority pupil and
his parents brought suit challenging the constitutionality of a 1975
Wisconsin statute."' Wisconsin enacted Chapter 220, which
"authorize[d] school districts to enter into voluntary agreements
providing for interdistrict transfers of pupils to promote racial
integration."' 3  A Chapter 220 agreement was executed by the
Menomonee Falls school district, a predominantly white suburban
school system, and the Milwaukee school district."14 Under this
agreement, minority students living in Milwaukee could transfer to
programs at Menomonee Falls schools with the state subsidizing the cost
of their tuition."5 Similarly, white students living in Menomonee Falls
could transfer to programs at Milwaukee public schools and receive
similar state support."6
In the spring of 1986, Jason Willan, a minority student in
Menomonee Falls, "applied to a summer school program at a Milwaukee
high school.""' Menomonee Falls did not offer a comparable program."
Willan was classified as a minority student by the Wisconsin interdistrict
transfer statute because he was at least one-half Oneida Indian."9 Since
his transfer did not promote racial integration, he did not qualify for state
subsidization of his tuition and transportation costs. 2' Willan's parents
were notified three days prior to the opening of summer school that he
(1) whether the Board had shown a factual justification for its choice of a 50% tipping
point; and (2) whether demographic projections supported the Board's determination that
the maximum allowable rate of change in racial composition of a school should be set at
the lesser of 4% or '4 of the difference between the current white enrollment and 50%
white enrollment.
Andrew Jackson 11, 738 F.2d at 577. On remand Judge Constantino issued a decision in which he
found "that the Board had failed to provide factual justification for its choice of a 50% tipping
point." Id. at 579. Thus, he found the plan invalid under the terms of the Second Circuit's remand,
See id. Since the district court found the plan invalid, it did not address the Board's limitation based
on the rate of change. See id. The Second Circuit in Andrew Jackson I1 disagreed with the district
court's conclusion that the Board failed to justify the 50% tipping point. See id. at 579. It remanded
the case to have the district court once again look at the evidence submitted on the issue of the 50%
tipping point and to look at the evidence on the limitation on the rate of change. See id. at 580-81.
111. 658 F. Supp. 1416 (E.D. Wis. 1987).
112. See id. at 1418.
113. Id.
114. Seeid.
115. See id.
116. Seeid.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. Seeid.
120. See id.
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did not qualify for state subsidization of his tuition and transportation."5
Since the unsubsidized cost of the program at the Milwaukee high
school was higher than the cost of other programs, his parents sent him
to another program in a different school district and paid S447.60.'-
Thereafter, the Willan's made a claim for the tuition to the Menomonee
Falls School Board, which was denied and followed by a lawsuit against
Menomonee Falls School Board and the Milwaukee Board of School
Directors." 3 On December 16, 1986, the Willans reached a settlement
with Menomonee Falls School Board, and a stipulation and order of
dismissal of the Menomonee Falls School Board and its individual
members was entered '24
The Milwaukee Board of School Directors and individual members
then filed for a dismissal of this cause of action, arguing that the
Willans' complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted."' In addressing this issue, the district court noted that "[i]t is
well-settled in federal law that state and local school authorities may
voluntarily adopt plans to promote integration even in the absence of a
specific finding of past discrimination."'f6 The district court specifically
noted that Justice Powell had lauded the Wisconsin statute at the center
of the controversy in this case in his dissenting opinion in Penick."
"This implicit endorsement of the constitutionality of [C]hapter 220
persuades me that the plaintiffs' extant collateral attack on an individual
aspect of the plan must fail.""
In Martin ec reL Lauren v. School District,' the plaintiffs filed a
complaint on September 6, 1995 on behalf of their children." The
complaint alleged that the School District of Philadelphia violated the
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 1418-19.
124. See id. at 1419.
125. See id. at 1422.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 1424; see also supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Powell's dissenting opinion in Columbus Board of Education r. Penick. 443 U.S. 449 (1979) 1.
128. IVillan, 658 F. Supp. at 1424; see also Lee v. Nyquist. 318 F. Supp. 710. 714 (W.D.N.Y
1970) (noting that it is well recognized that children that attend ethnically isolated schools do not
enjoy the opportunity to know or embrace those of other races, and the elimination of such
educational isolation may well be the key-or at least a large step--o racial harmony in this
country), aff'd sub nom. 402 U.S. 935 (1971); Jenkins v. Township of Morris Sch. Dist., 279 A.2d
619, 633 (NJ. 1971) (granting power to the Commissioner to merge Morris Township and
Morristow school systems if he finds it necessary to fulfill the state's educational and
desegregation policies).
129. No. 95-5650, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13861 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 1995).
130. Seeid.at*l.
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Equal Protection Clause by employing a student transfer policy sensitive
to the race or ethnicity of student transfer applicants. 3' These parents
sought to have their children transferred from the school to which their
children were initially assigned to a school outside of their
neighborhood.'32 The transfers "were denied either because the schools
to which their children wanted to transfer contained 65% or more
students of the same race as their children, or because the schools to
which their children were currently assigned contained 35% or less
students of the same race as their children."'33 The plaintiffs sought a
preliminary injunction against the operation of the 35%/65% student
transfer policy. '
The 35%/65% student transfer policy was a provision in a plan
adopted in 1976 in response to state court desegregation litigation.'
That desegregation plan required 'the School District [to] establish
system-wide procedures to encourage pupils of one race to transfer
voluntarily to schools where enrollments are predominantly of another
race."' 36 The Commonwealth Court approved the plan.' In 1994, the
Commonwealth Court addressed the need for continuing measures,
including the 35%/65% student transfer policy, "to remedy the de facto
segregation of the Philadelphia public schools.'33
The Commonwealth Court ... found that "the School District [of
Philadelphia] has failed to desegregate the public schools by all
feasible means and continues to maintain a racially segregated school
environment where all of the students do not receive equal educational
opportunities or a quality education mandated by the laws of this
Commonwealth. '' 3 9
In addressing the plaintiffs' equal protection challenge to the
35%/65% student transfer policy, the district court concluded that it "is
not bound by the factual findings of the Commonwealth Court."' "
Nevertheless, the "plaintiffs ... failed to demonstrate that they will be
able to contradict these findings which were the result of lengthy and
131. Seeid.at*l-*2.
132. See id. at *3-*4.
133. Id. at *3.
134. See id. at *2.
135. See id. at *6-*7.
136. Id. at *7 (quoting Desegregation Plan (July 1976) at 10).
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at *7-*8 (quoting Pa. Human Relations Comm'n v. School Dist., 638 A.2d 304, 328
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994)) (second alteration in original).
140. Id. at *8.
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apparently contentious proceedings."'"' The district court applied strict
scrutiny to this use of racial classifications.' "2 It found that the
compelling interest served by the 35%165% transfer policy was
remedying de facto segregation in order to insure that equal education
opportunities are provided "across racial lines."'4 The district court
stated that "there can be little doubt that the state's interest in ensuring
equal educational opportunities across racial lines is a compelling
one."' In concluding that the policy was narrowly tailored, the district
court noted "that the School District [wa]s acting under the supervision
of both the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ('PHRC') and
the Commonwealth Court.',4' The district court noted that "the burdens
on students who are denied transfers ... is relatively light" because they
are not subject to mandatory assignments. ' In conclusion, the district
court stated that "the use of a race-based student transfer policy was
accepted by the School District, the PHRC and the state courts only after
race-neutral measures were considered and only after broader and more
burdensome methods of achieving desegregation, such as involuntary
student transfers, were rejected."' 47
C. Decisions by Federal Courts Recognizing Broad Discretion of
School Officials to Use Racial Classifications to
Maintain Itegrated Faculties
Efforts by public schools to integrate their faculties raises issues
similar to those raised by efforts to promote integrated student bodies. A
number of federal court cases arose in situations where, absent a finding
of intentional segregation, a school system sought to reassign its public
school teachers to produce integrated faculties. Affected teachers
challenged these programs as violations of the Equal Protection Clause.
In rejecting these kinds of challenges, the Third Circuit and the Sixth
Circuit applied a standard lower than strict scrutiny to the teachers'
challenges.'
141. Id.
142. See id. at *8-*9.
143. Seeid. at*lO-*ll.
144. Id. at*8.
145. Id. at *9.
146. Id. at *9-*10.
147. Id. at*10.
148. See Jacobson v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 961 F.2d 100. 103 (61h Cir. 1992): Kronmick v.
Sch. Dist, 739 F.2d 894,903 (3d Cir. 1984).
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In Kromnick v. School District,49 the Third Circuit drew on the
opinion of Justice Brennan 50 in Regents of University of California v.
Bakke,151 which articulated a standard "that 'racial classifications
designed to further remedial purposes must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives,""" and on Chief Justice Burger's
opinion 53 in Fullilove v. Klutznick.' The Third Circuit determined that
"[the relevant factors that emerge from the Supreme Court opinions are
(1) the importance and validity of the remedial aim, (2) the competence
of the agency to choose such a remedy, and (3) the tailoring of the
remedy so as to limit the burden suffered by others."' 5
In a case decided after the Supreme Court's opinion in City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 56 the Sixth Circuit, in Jacobson v.
Cincinnati Board of Education,'57 affinred a transfer policy adopted by
the Cincinnati Board of Education to foster an integrated faculty absent a
finding of intentional segregation.5 The court cited to the language from
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,' granting
schools broad discretion in their ability to maintain a racially and
ethnically balanced student body, and determined that the policy merely
had to be substantially related to an important governmental interest (the
intermediate test articulated by Justice Brennan in Bakke)." The Sixth
Circuit held that the policy, which was implemented to achieve a racially
integrated faculty throughout the Cincinnati public school system, met
that test. 6'
149. 739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984).
150. See id. at 902. Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun. See id.
151. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
152. Kromnick, 739 F.2d at 902 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359
(1978)).
153. See id. Justice Burger's opinion was joined by Justices White and Powell. See id.
154. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
155. Kromnick, 739 F.2d at 904.
156. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
157. 961 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1992).
158. See id. at 103.
159. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
160. See Jacobson, 961 F.3d at 102, 103.
161. See id. at 103; see also Zaslawsky v. Bd. of Educ., 610 F.2d 661, 663, 664 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding that neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor Title VI precluded a school system "from
taking voluntary action to obtain better racial balance in its teaching faculty"); Vaughns v. Bd. of
Educ., 742 F. Supp. 1275, 1287 (D. Md. 1990) (justifying the efforts to maintain integrated faculty
assignments). It is well settled in federal law that state and local school authorities may voluntarily
adopt plans to promote integration even in the absence of a specific finding of past discrimination.
See Arval A. Morris, New Light on Racial Affirmative Action, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 219, 221-24
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D. Conclusion
The concern of the Supreme Court's school desegregation
jurisprudence was that federal courts' remedial orders for intentional
segregation not exceed what was necessary to cure an equal protection
violation. This jurisprudence did not contemplate severe limits on the
ability of state and local education officials' use of racial classifications
of students in order to integrate their public schools. From Brown r.
Board of Education, 2 racial isolation known by the term de facto
segregation was always considered by the Supreme Court to be harmful
to the education process. 63 It was only when this racial isolation,
however, was the product of intentional governmental conduct that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause." Thus, the Supreme Court's
school desegregation jurisprudence felt that if state or local school
officials decided for educational reasons that students would receive a
better education in an integrated school setting, such a decision was not
contrary to the Equal Protection Clause. Until recently, lower federal and
state court decisions followed the lead of the Supreme Court's school
desegregation jurisprudence. They upheld the use of racial
classifications to foster integrated student bodies and faculties. This
Article asserts that there was an unspoken assumption behind the
Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, and state courts accepting
broad powers of school officials to foster integration. Integrated
education furthered the internalization of a respect for individuality by
all students. Even though taking account of race could be viewed as
teaching students that race matters, nevertheless integrated education is
much more likely to further students internalizing the belief of the
importance of individuality than racially neutral admissions procedures
that fail to produce integrated student bodies.
(1987). Commentators seem to believe that school boards had broad discretion to take account of
race in order to maintain racially and ethnically balanced student bodies. See id.: Douglas D.
Scherer, Affirmative Action Doctrine and the Conflicting Messages of Croson. 38 U. KL . L RMv.
281,299-301 (1990).
162. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
163. See id. at 495. In one of the most quoted phrases in Bronn, the Court noted that "[tlo
separate [African American youth] from others of similar age and qualifications solely beaus of
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Id. at 494. The Court %-.ent on to quote
approvingly from the district court in Kansas: '"Segregation of %',hite and colored children in public
schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater vhen it has the
sanction of the law....' Id. (quoting a finding in the Kansas case).
164. See generally Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1. 413 U.S. 189, 208 (19731 (tholding -that a finding
of intentionally segregative school board actions ... establishes ... a prima facie case of unlatful
segregative design").
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III. RECENT COURT OF APPEALS CASES ADDRESSING EQUAL
PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO THE USE OF RACIAL
CLASSIFICATIONS BY PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY SCHOOLS
Until the last few years, lower courts accepted that public school
authorities possess broad powers to take steps to promote integrated
public schools. These courts did not require the use of racial
classifications to promote integration to be justified by a need to remedy
de jure segregation. In a complete reversal to the deference that had been
accorded state and local public school authorities, more recent decisions
have severely limited this power. The First, Second, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits have recently addressed equal protection challenges to the use
of racial classifications in the admissions process of public elementary
and secondary schools.' The Second and Ninth Circuit upheld actions
of school officials in the cases they addressed. In both cases, however,
the court's ratification of the school officials' use of racial classifications
was qualified.
A. First Circuit Case of Wessmann v. Gittens
In 1998, the First Circuit became the first federal appellate court to
reject the use of racial classifications in the admissions policies of public
elementary and secondary schools in the absence of an equal protection
violation as a predicate for such polices. In Wessmann v. Gittens,'4 the
First Circuit addressed a challenge to the student assignment policy
adopted by the Boston School Committee that governed its three
examination high schools. 67 Prior to litigation, admissions to Boston
Latin School ("BLS"), Boston Latin Academy, and O'Bryant were
generally determined based upon performance by applicants on a
165. While this Article will not address these cases separately in this Part, district courts in
Kentucky, Ohio, and North Carolina have also addressed this issue. See Brewer v. W. Irondequoit
Cent. Sch. Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d 619, 750-53 (W.D.N.Y. 1999); Capacchione v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Schs., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228, 232, 242 (W.D.N.C. 1999); Equal Open Enrollment Ass'n
v. Bd. of Educ., 937 F. Supp. 700,701,710 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
166. 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998). The Boston School Committee decided against appealing
the decision by the First Circuit. See Beth Daley & Andy Dabilis, In Switch, City Won't Appeal the
Latin Case: Wary of Hurting Efforts Nationally, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 4, 1999, at Al. Several
groups, including the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the United
States Department of Education, exerted pressure on the Committee. See id. They feared that this
case could provide a majority of members of the Supreme Court with the opportunity to render a
decision that would have disastrous consequences for affirmative action nationwide. See id.
167. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 791-92.
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standardized examination.' However, the School Committee sought to
maintain a 35% enrollment of black and Hispanic students.'"
In the 1970s, Boston was subject to a federal desegregation
decree.'70 While there was no specific evidence of discrimination at BLS,
it was included in the desegregation plan.' BLS was required to ensure
that at least 35% of its enrollment would be black and Hispanic." In
1987, the federal court released supervision over the student assignment
policies for Boston public schools.'" Nevertheless, the School
Committee continued to maintain the student assignment policy that
existed under the desegregation plan for its three examination high
schools. 74 In 1995, a disappointed white applicant challenged this
policy.'75 The district court granted the white student injunctive relief
and ordered that the applicant be admitted to BLS. 6 "The School
Committee then discontinued the 35% set-aside."'
The school officials "research[ed] alternative admissions policies in
hopes of finding one that might prevent" a precipitous drop of black and
Hispanic students. 7 These efforts can only adequately be understood
with the realization that over 70% of Boston's public school students are
African American or Hispanic.!" The superintendent of Boston public
schools "commissioned ... a consulting firm[] to review an array of
admissions options ranging from lotteries to strict merit-selection plans
and to report on how each option might affect the racial and ethnic
composition of the examination schools' entering classes."" - Aftcr the
consulting firm made its preliminary findings, a task force was
appointed to study the matter.' "The task force held meetings, hosted
public hearings, and ultimately recommended the adoption of...
'Option N50. ' '' 2 The School Committee accepted Option N50, because
168. See id. at792.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 792-93.
178. Id. at 793.
179. See id. at 798 n.4."Over the past decade, the relevant proportions hae be=n mra or less
as follows: 48% black, 25% Hispanic, 8% Asian, and 17 - v hite." Id.
180. Id. at 793.
181. Seeid.
182. Id.
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this plan "minimize[d] the diminution of black and Hispanic students."'8
The plan was to go into effect for the 1997-98 school year."4
Under the plan, all students took a standardized test.'85 They were
then ranked "[b]ased on a mathematical formula that purports to predict
academic performance.""' The applicants' test score was then combined
with the applicants' grade point average to derive a composite score. 7
Students are then numerically ranked based on their composite score. '
Half of the available seats were determined based on strict application of
the rankings from the composite score.'89 "The other half are allocated on
the basis of 'flexible racial/ethnic guidelines.""'  This was done by
"determin[ing] the relative proportions of five different racial/ethnic
[groupsi--white, black, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American--in the
remaining pool of qualified applicants (RQAP)," which is the top 50%
of the applicant pool less the ones already admitted.' 9' "[T]he
racial/ethnic distribution of the second group of successful applicants
must mirror" their corresponding percentages in the RQAP.' Once each
group's percentage was determined, then the top students in rank order
of a particular group were admitted accordingly.'" Therefore, "a member
of a designated racial/ethnic group may be passed over in favor of a
lower-ranking applicant from another group."'"4
The selection of the class for the 1997 school year can be used to
demonstrate how the plan operated. In 1997, there were ninety available
seats in BLS.'95 The first forty-five were awarded based on the composite
score.' 96 In order to get forty-five, forty-seven students were actually
admitted.' 97 The percentage of the different racial/ethnic groups in "the
RQAP was 27.83% black, 40.41% white, 19.21% Asian, 11.64%
Hispanic, and 0.31% Native American."' 98 Accordingly, of the remaining
forty-five students admitted, there were "13 blacks, 18 whites, 9 Asians,
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. SeeMi.
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. See i.
189. See id.
190. Id. (quoting the Policy).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. Id.
[Vol. 29:1
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS
and 5 Hispanics" admitted.'" Sarah Wessmann was ranked ninety-first.7
The application of Option N50 allowed blacks and Hispanics who
ranked between ninety-five and 150 to be admitted ahead of her.?'
Acting on Sarah's behalf, her father sued the School Committee
challenging the constitutionality of the policy.- The district court
entered judgment for the school officials, 3 and the First Circuit
reversed.' While agreeing that the admissions "[p]olicy does not
constitute a quota," the First Circuit noted that "[a]t a certain point in
[the] application process ... the [p]olicy relies on race and ethnicity, and
nothing else, to select a subset of entrants. :  Citing the Supreme
Court's opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the First
Circuit applied strict scrutiny to the policy? 7 Thus, "the [p]olicy must be
... justified by a compelling governmental interest and [be] narrowly
tailored" in order to advance that compelling state interest.=3
In addressing the issue of a compelling state interest, the First
Circuit mentioned two such interests. First, it noted that the Supreme
Court has held that state action is acceptable upon a showing that it is
needed to undo the continuing effects of an institution's past
discrimination. °20 Second, the First Circuit observed that beyond the need
to remedy the vestiges of past discrimination, courts occasionally
mention "diversity" as a compelling state interest. o Both the D.C.
Circuit, in Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC,2= and the Fifth
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Seeki.
202. See id. at 794.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 809.
205. Id. at 794.
206. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
207. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 794.
208. Id. Before actually applying strict scrutiny to the admissions policy, the First Circuit
addressed the argument advanced by the School Committee's reliance on the language from Swanm
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See Wessrrann, 160 F.3d at 796-
97. The School Committee argued that under the Supreme Cour's opinion in Swarm, they "haldl
'broad power to formulate and implement educational policy"' that allowed them to "prescrib[c] a
specific percentage of minority students to attend each school 'in order to prepare [them] to live in a
pluralistic society."' Id. at 796 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 16). The First Circuit rejected this
argument by stating that the central holding of Swann was that in order for federal courts to issue
remedial plans, there must be a finding of a constitutional violation. See id. at 797. Th7e language in
Swann pointing to the broad power of school authorities to take account of race in order to produce
integrated schools was merely non-binding dicta. See id.
209. Seeid.at795.
210. Seeki.
211. 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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Circuit, in Hopwood v. Texas,212 have concluded that only remedying
vestiges of past discrimination can justify race-based initiatives.2 1
Nevertheless, the First Circuit concluded that absent a clear signal from
the Supreme Court, it was not prepared to conclude that diversity could
not be a compelling state interest.1 4 The First Circuit "assum[ed]
arguendo ... that ... 'diversity' might be sufficiently compelling" and
that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke remains good law.3
The School Committee asserted different aspects of diversity to
justify its admissions policy. 26 First, the School Committee argued that a
diverse student body helps to prepare students for living in a pluralistic
society.2"7 Drawing testimony from school administrators, experts, and
alumni, the School Committee argued "that, because [American] society
is racially and ethnically heterogeneous, future leaders must learn to
converse with and persuade those who do not share their outlook or
experience., 218 This is even more imperative in light of technological
advances that now require more and more communication and
cooperation with those from "heretofore estranged nations and
cultures.,2'9 Given these developments, "diversity is essential to the
modem learning experience."' 0 Second, the School Committee also
asserted that diversity improves the academic environment by creating
an atmosphere for the robust exchange of ideas.22' Unless there are
adequate numbers of members of a given racial or ethnic group, they
will find it difficult, if not impossible, to express themselves. As a result,
the robust exchange of ideas, which is the goal of diversity, will not
occur.
The First Circuit rejected the School Committee's argument that a
threshold level of black and Hispanic students was necessary in order to
produce a robust exchange of ideas.m The First Circuit noted that the
School Committee had not provided a strong showing of necessity for
the requirement of a minimum number of minorities in order to create
such an atmosphere.m But even more importantly, the First Circuit noted
212. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), vacated by 95 F.3d 53 (5th Cir. 1996).
213. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 354; Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948.
214. See Wessnann, 160 F.3d at 796.
215. Id.
216. Seeid. at797.
217. Seeid. at796.
218. Id. at 797.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 799.
223. See id.
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that the diversity, which Justice Powell alluded to, was one that
'encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important
element.'' 4 Powell's concept of diversity, therefore, focused on
individuals and not on racial and ethnic groups. To the extent the policy
promotes racial and ethnic diversity over individual diversity, it is at
variance with Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. When this point was
raised at oral argument, counsel for the School Committee responded
that "BLS historically has been diverse with respect to everything but
race and ethnicity.' " ' The School Committee pointed to the work of its
consultant who stated "that all [admissions] options [under
consideration] would result in substantial gender, neighborhood, and
socioeconomic diversity, but that, unless race and ethnicity were
explicitly factored into the admissions calculus, attainment of racial and
ethnic diversity might be jeopardized. ' ' -6 The First Circuit rejected this
argument.m It reasoned that "strict merit-selection" would produce a
combined percentage of black and Hispanic students that would be
between 15% and 20%.2"
Even on the assumption that the need for racial and ethnic diversity
alone might sometimes constitute a compelling interest sufficient to
warrant some type of corrective governmental action, it is perfectly
clear that the need would have to be acute-much more acute than the
relatively modest deviations that attend the instant case. -m
The First Circuit concluded that what the School Committee sought
was not diversity, but racial balancing.2-
The Policy is, at bottom, a mechanism for racial balancing-and
placing our imprimatur on racial balancing risks setting a precedent
that is both dangerous to our democratic ideals and almost always
constitutionally forbidden.
It cannot be said that racial balancing is either a legitimate or
necessary means of advancing the lofty principles recited in the
Policy.2'
224. Id. at 798 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,315 (1978)).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. See id. "Over the past decade, the relevant proportions have been more or less as folloaS:
48% black, 25% Iispanic, 8% Asian, and 17%, white." Id. at 798 n.4.
229. Id. at 798.
230. See id.
231. Id.at 799.
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After rejecting the arguments for diversity, the First Circuit then
went on to address the arguments advanced by the School Committee for
the other asserted compelling state interest remedying vestiges of past
discrimination. 2 The First Circuit noted that for this to be a compelling
state interest, "government actors must be able to muster a 'strong basis
in evidence' showing that a current social ill in fact has been caused by
such" past discrimination. 2
The School Committee argued that a provision in a decree issued in
its desegregation litigation required it "to remedy any racial imbalance
occurring in the school system." Judge Garrity issued the provision in
question in a 1994 decree.25 The provision "enjoin[ed] the School
Committee 'from discriminating on the basis of race in the operation of
the public schools of the City of Boston and from creating, promoting or
maintaining racial segregation in any school or other facility in the
Boston public school system.' ''2 6 The First Circuit rejected this
argument. It noted that over ten years ago there had been a finding that
Boston public schools had obtained unitariness with regard to student
assignments.28
Once there [was such] a finding of unitariness and the "affirmative
duty to desegregate ha[d] been accomplished," school authorities
[were] not expected to make "year-by-year adjustments of the racial
composition of student bodies" absent a "showing that either the
school authorities or some other agency of the State has deliberately
attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial
composition of the schools."239
Thus, the provision contained in the decree did not require the school
officials to take affirmative action.240 It was "a negative injunction,
forbidding the [School Committee] from engaging in the acts that
supported the original cause of action" to prevent resegregation.24' As
long as school officials do not engage in discrimination against
minorities, they would not violate this negative injunction.22
232. See id. at 800.
233. Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)).
234. Id.
235. See id.
236. Id. at 801 (quoting "Permanent Injunction" provision of Judge Garrity's decree).
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. Id. (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971)).
240. See id.
241. Id.
242. See id.
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The School Committee also argued that the "'achievement gap'
between black and Hispanic students, on the one hand, and white and
Asian students, on the other," are rooted in "the discriminatory regime of
the 1970s and before."2 3 The School Committee pointed to the statistical
evidence demonstrating "a persistent achievement gap" in terms of
relative performance on standardized tests "at the primary school level
between white and Asian students, on the one hand, and black and
Hispanic students, on the other."2"
The First Circuit accepted arguendo, that a documented
achievement gap may be a vestige of past discrimination. "' It asserted,
however, that there must be satisfactory evidence of a causal connection
between the achievement gap and discriminatory state conduct. ' The
First Circuit noted that "achievement gap statistics, by themselves, do
not ... eliminate the possibility that they are caused by ... 'societal
discrimination."' 2 7 "The ... fact that an institution once was found to
have practiced discrimination is insufficient, in and of itself, to satisfy a
state actor's burden of producing the reliable evidence" linking the
achievement gap to discriminatory state conduct.24S
In order to satisfy this causal connection, the School Committee
argued that the chief reason for the achievement gap is "'low teacher
expectations"' for black and Hispanic students. '  But the First Circuit
rejected the testimony provided by the School Committee for this causal
connection as inadequate.20 The one expert who testified about the link
between low teacher expectation and low student achievement had not
conducted a systematic study of Boston school teachers.2 Rather, he
drew an analogy from his work in the Kansas City public schools to the
Boston public schools.-' The First Circuit concluded that the other
evidence introduced by the School Committee to support the connection
between low teacher expectation and the achievement gap on
standardized tests was anecdotal and therefore, not persuasive in light of
the absence of a systematic pattern of discrimination.1
3
243. Id.
244. Id. at 802-03.
245. See id. at 803.
246. See id. at 804.
247. Id. at 803 (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,909-10 (1996)).
248. Id. at 802.
249. Id. at 804 (quoting the testimony of Doctor William Trent).
250. See id. at 805.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 804.
253. See id. at 805.
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Even though the First Circuit concluded that the School Committee
failed to establish a remedial purpose as a compelling state interest, it
went on to address the narrowly tailored aspect of this interest as well.2"'
Even if there was a system-wide achievement gap due to low teacher
expectation, the First Circuit noted that Option N50 does not address
those low teacher expectations."' The court noted that it could be argued
that Option N50 is intended to be "partial compensation for injustices
done at the [elementary] school level." 6 Given the minority students
who benefit from Option N50, however, this argument did not logically
follow.2' 7 Option N50 was not limited to black and Hispanic students
who attended Boston's public elementary schools." "[M]any of the
black and Hispanic students [who would be] admitted under [Option
N50] come from private or parochial [elementary] schools." ' Since they
were not harmed by lower teacher expectations in Boston's public
elementary schools, Option N50 was not narrowly tailored "toward
curing the harm done to the class of actual victims. ' '2W The court also
noted that the inclusion of Asians who were admitted over Sarah
Wessmann was problematic. 26' Since there was no evidence of low
teacher expectations regarding Asian students, their inclusion in Option
N50 could not be justified. 62 Finally, the First Circuit noted that the
policy could lead to the exclusion of Hispanic students in favor of whites
or Asians in certain anomalous situations. 63 This in fact happened in
1997 when two Hispanics were excluded in favor of a white student. '
B. Fourth Circuit Cases of Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board
and Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schools
There are two cases from the Fourth Circuit that have recently
rejected the use of racial classifications in determining admissions to
public schools: Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board6' and Eisenberg
254. See id. at 807.
255. See id.
256. Id. at 808.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Seeid.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. 120 S. Ct. 1552 (U.S. 2000).
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v. Montgomery County Public Schools.-" The Supreme Court recently
denied certiorari in both of these cases.:67
In Tuttle, the Fourth Circuit addressed a challenge to the use of
racial classifications in the kindergarten admissions policy ("Policy") of
Arlington Traditional School ("ATS").-" ATS accepted applications for
kindergarten throughout the school district.: " It "sought to obtain a
student body 'in proportions that approximate the distribution of
students from [three different] groups in the district's overall student
population."'2' Thus the Policy focused on three different characteristics
of applicants: "(1) whether the applicant was from a low-income or
special family background, (2) whether English was the applicant's first
or second language, and (3) the racial or ethnic group to which the
applicant belonged."27' The stated goals of the Policy were as follows:
(1) "to prepare and educate students to live in a diverse, global society"
by "reflect[ing] the diversity of the community" and (2) to help the
School Board "serve the diverse groups of students in the district,
including those from backgrounds that suggest they may come to
school with educational needs that are different from or greater than
others., , rn
In 1998, the year the Policy went into effect, there were 185
applications for sixty-nine available positions " ATS first offered
admissions to twenty-three "applicants who were the siblings of older
students already attending ATS. ' ' 4 For the remaining forty-six spaces,
ATS conducted a "weighted random lottery." ' The probabilities that a
given applicant would be selected in the lottery were weighted so that
those from underrepresented groups in the applicant pool had an
increased chance of selection. '76 The plaintiffs neither had siblings
attending ATS, nor was their probability of selection enhanced based on
266. 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub non 120 S. CL 1420 (U.S. 2000).
267. See Arlington County Sch. Bd. v. Tuttle, 120 S. CL 1552 (U.S. 2000); Montgom2ry
County Pub. Sch. v. Eisenberg, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (U.S. 2000).
268. See Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 700. The challenged Policy was created in resrorvs to prior
litigation that had attacked an earlier admissions policy. See Tito v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., No.
97-540-A, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7932, at *3 (E.D. Va. May 13, 1997).
269. See Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 701.
270. Id. (quoting the February 1998 Policy).
271. Id.
272. Id. (quoting the February 1998 Policy) (alteration in original).
273. See id.
274. Id. at 702.
275. Id.
276. See id.
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diversity factors because they were not members of any of the
underrepresented groups.2"
After not being selected in the lottery the applicants, "by and
through" their parents, filed a complaint and a motion for preliminary
injunction against the School Board to bar ATS's continued use of the
weighted admission policy.278 Stating that "as a matter of law, 'diversity
was not a compelling governmental interest,' '2 79 the district court ruled
in favor of the applicants.m The district court ordered the School Board
"to institute a 'double-blind random lottery without the use of any
preferences' to admit students to ATS."28" ' The court's order also
included a provision that "permanently enjoined [the School Board]
from not only using race, color, and national origin, but also family
income and first language in admitting students to ATS.'"2 The School
Board appealed asserting, among other arguments, that the Policy did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause and that the permanent
injunction issued by the district court was overbroad. 83
Even though the Policy included three different characteristics of
applicants, the Fourth Circuit's opinion focused only on the aspect of
race and ethnicity.2 For that aspect of the Policy, the Fourth Circuit
noted that "the Policy involves a racial classification.""28 Citing Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,u6 the Court concluded that "[a]ll racial
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny. 287 The school officials did
not contend that the Policy it adopted was to remedy past
discrimination."8 Thus, it relied on diversity as the compelling state
interest to justify the Policy."9 Like the First Circuit in Wessmann, the
Fourth Circuit accepted that diversity may have been a compelling state
interest,29 but found that the Policy was not narrowly tailored to advance
that interest. 
2 9
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. Id. at 703 (quoting the district court's order).
280. See id. at 702-03.
281. Id. at 703 (quoting the district court's order).
282. Id.
283. See id.
284. See id. at 705.
285. Id. at 704.
286. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
287. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 704.
288. See id. at 700.
289. See id. at 704.
290. See id.
291. See id. at 707.
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The Fourth Circuit drawing on one of its earlier cases in the
employment context stated:
When reviewing whether a state racial classification is narrowly
tailored, we consider factors such as: "(1) the efficacy of alternative
race-neutral policies, (2) the planned duration of the policy, (3) the
relationship between the numerical goal and the percentage of minority
group members in the relevant population or work force, (4) the
flexibility of the policy, including the provision of waivers if the goal
cannot be met, and (5) the burden of the policy on innocent third
parties."
In applying these factors, the Fourth Circuit noted a number of
problems with the use of racial classifications by the Policy.l'1 First,
there are "alternative race-neutral" methods that could be used to
promote diversity.2' Second, the Court criticized the Policy for the lack
of a terminating point.295 The third criticism raised by the Fourth Circuit
is the most fundamental one. The Court noted that "[t]he Policy seeks to
achieve racial and ethnic diversity in its classes 'in proportions that
approximate the distribution of students from [racial] groups in the
district's overall student population.' The means employed by the Policy
292. Id. at 706 (quoting Hayes v. N. State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n. 10 F.d 207. 216
(4th Cir. 1993)). One can quickly see that the factors that the Fourth Circuit cites are not all
applicable in the context of public education, especially where the compelling state interest is
diversity as opposed to remedying the effects of identified discrimination. The Fourth Circuit did
acknowledge "that these factors are particularly difficult to assess %here, as here, the policies are
not tied to identified past discrimination." Hayes. 10 F-Id at 216 n.8.
293. See Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706-07.
294. See id. at 706. The court noted that the Study Committee had suggested three such
alternatives:
1. Assign a small geographic area to identified alternative schools as the hom=
school for that area, and fill the remaining spaces in the entering class by means of an
unweighted random lottery from a self-selected applicant pool. The geographic area
would presumably be selected so that its residents would positively effect the diversity of
the school.
2. An additional option was to have all names of an entering class in the county
automatically put into the lottery. All students are then selected at random and offered
admission until the class is full. Another method would be to offer randomly selected
families the opportunity to have their child's name placed in a second lottery from which
those students selected would be offered admission. This method would require all
families, even those not interested in alternative schools, to make an active choice.
3. Each neighborhood school would be allotted a certain number of slots at each
alternative school. The number of slots per school would be determined either by the
percentage of that school's population relative to ATS student population or by the
extent of overcrowding at the school ....
Id. at 706 nL 11 (alteration in original).
295. See id. at 706.
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to achieve such numerical racial and ethnic diversity is racial
balancing."296
The School Board attempted to counter by arguing that even though
members of underrepresented groups had a greater chance of being
selected, every applicant, regardless of race, is able to compete for every
available spot.2 Thus, the Policy was not "straight racial balancing." '98
The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that these were
"distinctions without differences." 99 The Fourth Circuit went on to state
that "[t]he Policy's two goals, to provide students with the educational
benefits of diversity and to help the School Board better serve the
diverse groups of students in its district, do not require racial
balancing."'' Fourth, the court argued that since the Policy did not
consider each applicant on an individual basis to determine whether his
or her inclusion promoted diversity, the Policy was not flexible."'
Finally, the court stated that "[t]he innocent third parties in this case are
young kindergarten-age children."' The court noted the irony of a
policy that is intended "to teach young children to view people as
individuals rather than members of certain racial and ethnic groups
classifies those same children as members of ... racial and ethnic
groups."' '
Two weeks after issuing its opinion in Tuttle, the Fourth Circuit
followed it with Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schools.3W In
the Eisenberg opinion, the Fourth Circuit noted that this case was
practically indistinguishable from Tuttle.3" Jacob Eisenberg applied as a
first grader for a transfer to the Rosemary Hills Elementary School, a
math and science magnet school, for the 1998-99 school year" 6
Montgomery County denied his request due to the negative impact it
296. Id. at 707 (quoting the February 1998 policy) (second alteration in original).
297. See id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See id.
302. Id.
303. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded by affirming the district court's holding that the Policy
was unconstitutional, but vacated the permanent injunction and remanded for an evidentiary
hearing. See id. at 708. "[T]he Applicants were entitled to an injunction," but not to a permanent one
"ordering the School Board to adopt a particular admissions policy." Id. The Fourth Circuit decided
that "[t]he district court should have taken the less intrusive step of continuing to monitor and
review alternative programs proposed by the School Board." Id.
304. 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. 120 S. Ct. 1420 (U.S. 2000).
305. See id. at 130.
306. See id. at 125.
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would have on diversity." The issue presented in Eisenberg was
"whether ... Montgomery County ... [could] deny a student's request
to transfer to a magnet school because of his race.' '
Montgomery County is a large school district with over 125,000
students and over 180 schools.? The County was never subject to a
school desegregation order, but adopted a number of steps voluntarily to
"dismantleo the former segregated school system."3 One part of their
desegregation efforts was "the implementation of magnet school
programs..... These programs sought to "attract and retain [a] diverse
student enrollment on a voluntary basis to schools outside the area in
which the student lives."" School stability and utilization were the first
factors considered in determining whether to grant a request to attend a
magnet school t3 According to the transfer policy, "'[transfers that
negatively affect diversity are usually denied."' 34 Despite the negative
impact on diversity, students whose transfer would alleviate a personal
hardship were sometimes approved."5
In the case of Jacob Eisenberg, he was assigned to Glen Haven
Elementary School, where the enrollment of white students was below
the 53.4% of whites for the entire school district3 6 The percentage of
white students at Glen Haven had declined in the three years from 38.9%
to 24.1%.317 The school that Jacob wanted to transfer into was Rosemary
Hills Elementary School,A8 but Jacob did not have a personal hardship
reason to justify his request for transfer.3t9 Montgomery County denied
Jacob's transfer because it would have negatively impacted diversity.:
After their appeals to the Superintendent and the Board of
Education were denied, Jacob's parents filed suit claiming an equal
307. See id.
308. Id. at 124.
309. See id. at 125.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See id. at 125-26.
314. Id. at 126 (quoting the Transfer Booklet) (alteration in original). Students are classified by
their racialfethnic group as African American, Asian, Hispanic, or white. See id.
315. See id. at 127 n.10.
316. Seeid. at127.
317. See id.
318. See id.
319. See id. "Five white students, out of 19 who applied, were permitted to transfer out of Glen
Haven for the 1998-99 school year on a personal hardship basis. Four of these transfers were
permitted because the transferring student had a sibling already attending the requested schoo." Id.
at 127 n.10.
320. See id. at 127.
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protection violation.32" ' Applying strict scrutiny, "[t]he district court
denied the Eisenbergs' motion for a preliminary injunction," reasoning
that Montgomery County's asserted interests in avoiding the creation of
segregative enrollment by racial isolation and in promoting a diverse
student population "were each sufficiently compelling ... to justify the
transfer policy's race based classifications under... 'strict scrutiny.'' '
The Eisenbergs appealed. 3
The Fourth Circuit concluded "that, despite the different
nomenclature," the two asserted compelling interests were actually the
same.324 "[T]he avoidance of racial isolation [w]as 'a negatively-phrased
expression for attaining the opposite of racial isolation which is racial
diversity. ' "' As it did in Tuttle, the Fourth Circuit assumed that
diversity was a compelling state interest and then analyzed the transfer
policy to see if it was narrowly tailored. 6 The court concluded that the
"use of racial classifications in its transfer decisions [wa]s [not] narrowly
tailored to the interest of obtaining diversity." '327 The plan was one of
mere racial balancing in a pure form and '[s]uch nonremedial racial
balancing is unconstitutional.""'32
C. Ninth Circuit Case of Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of
University of California
Over the dissent of Judge Beezer, 29 the Ninth Circuit in Hunter ex
rel. Brandt v. Regents of University of California33 upheld the use of
321. See id.
322. Id. at 128.
323. See id. at 128.
324. Id. at 130.
325. Id. (quoting Brewer v. w. lrondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d 619, 627
(W.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated by 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000)).
326. See id.
327. Id. at 131.
328. Id. (quoting Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 705 (4th Cir. 1999))
(alteration in original).
329. Judge Beezer asserted that the only compelling state interest that should justify the use of
racial classifications was remedial. See Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d
1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999) (Beezer, J., dissenting). Beezer also found that the consideration of race
was not narrowly tailored. See id. at 1076 (Beezer, J., dissenting). Beezer argued that the University
based its use of race and ethnicity on the belief "that 'children with different ethnic backgrounds
often have different learning styles."' Id. at 1077 (Beezer, J., dissenting) (quoting testimony of
Professor Deborah Stipek). The University had not, however, established that these particular
children, from their particular racial or ethnic backgrounds, had different leaming styles. See id. at
1078 (Beezer, J., dissenting). In addition, the University had failed to consider race neutral-ways of
accomplishing its objective, specifically, "the establishment of one or more additional laboratory
elementary schools in areas of California where the demographic diversity would naturally produce
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racial classifications in determining the student make up at Corinne A.
Seeds University Elementary School ("UES")."3 UES is "an elementary
school operated as a research laboratory by UCLA's Graduate School of
Education and Information Studies."
Its research and training mission is to help the State of California meet
the needs of a dramatically changing public school population. To this
end, UES identifies issues relevant to the education and social
development of children in multicultural, urban communities, conducts
research on these issues, and develops innovations in teaching based
on this research. UES shares its research results with public school
teachers throughout the State of California through seminars,
workshops, teacher training programs, and published articles."'
Under the direction of the Dean of the Graduate School of
Education and Information Studies and the Director of UES, UES's
Admissions Committee decided "what characteristics are needed in [its]
460-student [body] to fulfill its research and training [agenda]."4
Gender, race/ethnicity, and family income are specifically considered in
the admissions process." Other factors that might affect the suitability
of a given student as a research subject, such as "dominant language,
permanence of residence, and parents' willingness to comply with
UES's mandatory involvement requirement[,]" were also considered."'
Keeley Hunter was denied admission to UES, and her parents
brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the admissions
process. 37 The district court upheld the admissions process"' and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed. ' 9 In applying strict scrutiny to UES's use of
race/ethnicity as a factor in the admissions process, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that "California's interest in the operation of a research-
oriented elementary school dedicated to improving the quality of
applicant pools with any desired raciallethnic mix." Id. (Beezer. J., dissenting). Finally, he criticized
the inclusion of a category for mixed-race children. See id. at I080 (Beezer, J., dissenting). Noting
that if what the University was trying to define were the learning styles of different racial and ethnic
groups, the inclusion of a mixed race group of students was "incomprehensible:' See id. (Beazer, J.,
dissenting).
330. 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999).
331. See id. at 1062, 1067.
332. Id. at 1062.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See id.
336. Id.
337. See id. at 1063.
338. See id. at 1067.
339. See id.
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education in urban public schools is a compelling state interest."o The
court noted "[t]he challenges posed by California's increasingly diverse
population."' ' "Cultural and economic differences in the classroom pose
special problems for public school teachers." 2 Among these challenges
are 'limited language proficiency, different learning styles, involvement
of parents from diverse cultures with different expectations and values,
and racial and ethnic conflict among families and children."'" 3 The
Ninth Circuit, however, noted that its decision was based on the fact that
UES is "a laboratory school with a research mission."' This research
mission "make[s] UIES an exceptional school and a valuable resource to
California's public education system." 5 In determining that the use of
racial classifications in the admissions process was narrowly tailored, the
Ninth Circuit relied heavily upon the judgement of the academic
researchers.' 6 The Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court .'ha[s]
stressed the importance of avoiding second-guessing of legitimate
academic judgments."' 7
D. Second Circuit Case of Brewer v. West Irondequoit
Central School District
The only recent decision by a court of appeals upholding a broad
power of public elementary and secondary schools to use racial
classifications for the purpose of integrating schools is the Second
Circuit opinion in Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central School District.:
340. Id. at 1063.
341. Id. at 1064.
342. Id.
343. Id. (quoting Judge Kenyon's district court opinion).
344. Id. at 1065. "UES's research is funded in part through federal and private grants and its
students are protected by all federal, state, and university guidelines, rules, and policies pertaining to
research involving human subjects." Id. The research produced at UES is also "shared through 'a
variety of publications, the television and film industries, computer technologies, and other media,'
as well as through 'seminars, workshops, observation opportunities, and conferences' offered to
teachers, administrators, researchers, and educational policy makers." Id. (quoting UES's research
mission).
345. Id.
346. See id. 1066.
347. Id. at 1067 (quoting Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990)). "This Court itself
has cautioned that judges ... asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision ...
should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment."' Id. (quoting Univ. of Pa., 493
U.S. at 199 ) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
348. 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000). One other recent district court case deserves to be
mentioned. In Hampton v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 102 F. Supp. 2d 358 (,V.D. Ky.
2000), parents of students brought an action seeking to dissolve the school desegregation decree
covering Jefferson County, Kentucky. See id. at 359-60. The court held that the school district's
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The opinion for the divided Second Circuit was written by Justice
Straub? 49 While Justice Parker signed the opinion, he also wrote a
separate concurring opinion. 50 Judge Miner dissented."'
Parents of Jessica Haak, a white fourth grader residing in the
Rochester City School District ("RCSD"), challenged the operation of
the Urban-Suburban Interdistrict Transfer Program ("Program"). The
Program currently had several stated objectives, including enhancing
and enriching the participating schools and their communities by
"'Reducing Minority Group Isolation[,] Encouraging Intercultural
Learning[,] Promoting Academic Excellence[, and] Fostering
good faith compliance with a desegregation decree for twenty-five years %arranted dissolution. See
id. at 377. After the court determined that the school district had eradicated the vestiges of it-, prior
dejure conduct, the court then addressed the continued use of racial classifications by the Jefferson
County Public Schools to determine admissions to its various schools. See id. at 360. The di-strict
court concluded that the "voluntary maintenance of the desegregated school system should be
considered a compelling state interest." Id. at 379. The court noted that "it [was) incongruous [for] a
federal court... at one moment [to] require a school board to use race to prevent resegregation of
the system, and at the very next moment prohibit that same policy." Id. The court determined that
"[a]s among basically equal schools, the use of race would not be a 'preference.'" IA. at 380. Thus,
the School Board "would not be prohibited from using race in its general student assignmnts to
maintain its desegregated school system, even to the extent of some racial guidelines." Ld. But with
respect to the school district's magnet programs, the situation was different. See id. They offered
educational "programs that are not available at other high schools." Id. Thus, this is not a situation
where the education was fungible. See id. at 380-81. As a consequence, the court required the
School Board to revise its admissions policies at its magnet schools. See id. at 381.
349. See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 740.
350. See id. at 740, 753 (Parker, J., concurring).
351. See id. at 740, 754 (liner, J., dissenting). Judge Miner agreed that the court % as bound by
its decisions in the Andrew Jackson cases. See id, at 756 (Miner, J., dissenting). Thus, he accepted
that promoting "more lasting integration in the face of defacto segregation .... promoting racial
diversity, or ... reducing racial isolation" were all similarly compelling state interests. Id. fMiner,
J., dissenting). Miner, however, did not believe that the narrowly tailored prong was satisfied. See
id. at 757 (Miner, J., dissenting). He noted that:
The Supreme Court has enumerated the factors to be considered in assessing the
appropriateness of race-conscious remedies: "the necessity for the relief and the efficacy
of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of the relief, including the
availability of waiver provisions; the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant
[student population]; and the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties.'
ld. at 756-57 (iner, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987))
(plurality opinion) (alteration in original). In considering those factors, Judge Miner noted that
"[tihere was absolutely no effort of any kind to assess any of these factors in establishing the
Program." Id. at 757 (Miner, J., dissenting). In applying the Paradise factors, he noted that there
was "no consideration... given to the length of time the Program hald] been in [effect)... without
any apparent success in reducing racial isolation." Id. (Miner, J., dissenting). "There [ as] no
showing that any alternate remedies, such as magnet schools, vouchers, open enrollment, or
redrawing boundaries,' were examined. Id. (Miner, J., dissenting). "The relationship of [the]
numerical goals to the total student population [were] not ... examined:' Id. (Miner, J.. dissenting).
The impact on the rights of third parties was not considered. See id. (Miner, J., dissenting).
352. Seeid. at740-41.
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Responsible Civic Leadership.' 353 Although the plaintiffs emphasized
the differing stated goals, the district court found "that 'it is clear that the
main purpose of the Program is to reduce what is described as "racial
isolation" within the population of the participating school districts."'""
"In other words, the [P]rogram is designed to reduce the percentage of
minority students in predominately minority city schools, and to increase
the percentage of minority students in predominately white suburban
schools. 355
"The Program [is] one of the oldest voluntary desegregation efforts
in the nation .... the only one of its kind in New York, and one of only
two or three such voluntary programs in the United States.""' 6 It had its
genesis in a 1965 agreement between the RCSD and the West
Irondequoit School District.357 The agreement provided for voluntary
student transfers between their respective school districts in order 'to
reduce, prevent and eliminate minority group isolation in the schools of
Rochester and Monroe County through voluntary desegregation. ' "'
"Over the years, several other suburban districts ... voluntarily joined
the Program; currently seven school districts-Rochester, West
Irondequoit, Brighton, Brockport, Penfield, Pittsford and Wheatland-
Chili--participate in the Program.
3 59
For a number of years, funding for the Program came from the
federal government pursuant to the Emergency School Aid Act of
1972.'60 Congress enacted the Act "to further 'the process of eliminating
or preventing minority group isolation.' ' 361 But this statute was repealed
in 1982.362 After that, "New York State began providing funding for the
Program. 363 The New York "statute provides that 'a school district
which accepts pupils from another school district in accordance with a
voluntary interdistrict urban-suburban transfer program designed to
reduce racial isolation ... shall be eligible for aid. ' '' 314 "The State
provides aid to the receiving school district and provides reimbursement
353. Id. at 742 (quoting the Program's Mission Statement).
354. Id. (quoting Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d 619, 621
(W.D.N.Y. 1999)).
355. Id. (quoting Brever, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 619).
356. Id. at 741-42.
357. See id. at 742.
358. Id. (quoting the Program's Mission Statement).
359. Brewer, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 621, vacated by 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000).
360. See id.
361. Id. (quoting a repealed federal statute).
362. See id.
363. Id.
364. Id. (quoting the statute that provided funding for the Program).
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for some costs associated with the attendance of the transferring
student."'365 The funding for the Program allowed a "student to
matriculate as a non-resident student without being required to pay
tuition, which would normally be required."'' "The Program, in effect,
allows a student to transfer to another district without any financial
consequence to the student."36'
"The participating districts' joint application to the Commissioner
of Education for the 1996-97 school year indicates that overall, the
suburban districts reported a minority student population of less than ten
percent, while the RCSD reported a minority student population of about
eighty percent."" As of July 1997, RCSD had 37,153 pupils, of which
roughly 29,700 were minorities.369 "The Progam is very popular and it
appears that the number of applicants far exceeds the space available in
the six suburban districts."")
"As the Program is ... administered, only minority pupils are
allowed to transfer from city schools to suburban schools. White
students may be transferred from suburban schools to the city, [if] the
transfer 'do[es] not negatively affect the racial balance of the receiving
school."''" RCSD reported that 591 minority pupils had been transferred
during the 1996-97 school year to the suburban schools, and twenty-nine
white students were accepted into RCSD. "-
In 1996, the parents of Jessica L. Haak sought to have her
transferred from her resident school district in Rochester to a suburban
school. 73 In 1998, Jessica was accepted for placement at the Iroquois
Elementary School for the 1998-99 school year.3' However, upon
discovering that Jessica was white, the director of the Program denied
her transfer.3 7 After Jessica was denied admission, her parents filed suit
claiming that Jessica's exclusion from the Program violated the Equal
365. a at 622.
366. Id. at 621.
367. Ld. at 622.
368. Md
369. See id.
370. Id.
371. Id. (quoting Rochester City School District Directory 1997-98 (Couman Af. tx. G) at
19)) (third alteration in original). "IM]inority pupil' is defined as ."a pupil %, ho is of Black or
Hispanic origin or is a member of another racial minority group that historically has becn the
subject of discrimination.' Id. (quoting 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 175.241a)t1)) (emphasis .ddzd). But
"students of Asian or American Indian origin are also considered to be minority pupils eligible for
transfer to suburban schools." Id.
372. See id.
373. See id. at 623.
374. See id.
375. See UdL at 624.
2000)
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW
Protection Clause.376 The district court granted the plaintiffs motion for
a preliminary injunction on the ground that the denial of Haak's request
to transfer to the participating suburban district under the Program
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The Second Circuit, relying heavily on both of its earlier opinions
in Andrew Jackson P8 and 1I,371 overturned the district court opinion.S
The court noted that the "precise issue [being addressed in this case] was
not addressed explicitly in the Andrew Jackson cases." '' But the Second
Circuit went on to say that from the Andrew Jackson cases:
it is clear that in order to conclude that "[ilt is permissible ... for local
officials to attempt voluntarily to correct or combat such ... [racial]
imbalance at a slower pace than would be satisfactory for a school or
district under a court order to dismantle a dual system," the panels in
the Andrew Jackson cases necessarily must have considered whether
the school district could constitutionally act at all.
382
In fact the Second Circuit noted that "Andrew Jackson I held, in the
words of Andrew Jackson II, that the Plan's aim 'to promote a more
lasting integration is a sufficiently compelling purpose to justify as a
matter of law excluding some minority students from schools of their
choice under the obviously race-conscious Rate of Change Plan."'383 The
court cited Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education3" and City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.3" as the only Supreme Court cases
decided since the Andrew Jackson cases that were relevant to the
Andrew Jackson holdings, even though neither Wygant or Croson
involved public school desegregation.386 However, the court concluded
that based on the advanced stage of the proceedings, it was reasonable to
assume that "desegregation of a student population in the public school
system ... is more compelling than reduction of racial isolation ... in
the commercial context-teacher's jobs and the construction industry." 8 '
The court went on to note that while Wygant and Croson "may raise
376. See id.
377. See id. at 635.
378. 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979).
379. 738 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1984).
380. See Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Scb. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 753 (2d Cir. 2000).
381. Id. at750.
382. Id. (quoting Andrew Jackson 1, 598 F.2d at 713) (citation omitted) (alterations in original).
383. Id. (quoting Andrew Jackson II, 738 F.2d at 577).
384. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
385. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
386. See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 751.
387. Id.
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questions as to the vitality of Andrew Jackson I & I's holdings, [the
court could not] conclude that the law has been sufficiently altered" to
overrule those holdings.3
The Second Circuit concluded that it was bound by its prior
determination in the Andrew Jackson cases and "that a compelling
interest can be found in a program that has as its object the reduction of
racial isolation and what appears to be defacto segregation." '' When the
court turned to the narrow tailoring aspect, it concluded that "[i]f
reducing racial isolation is-standing alone--a constitutionally
permissible goal, as we have held it is under the Andrew Jackson cases,
then there is no more effective means of achieving that goal than to base
decisions on race."
While the majority opinion in Brewer suggested a broad
endorsement of the power of school boards to take account of race and
ethnicity in order to promote integrated student bodies, Justice Parker's
concurring opinion places a major potential obstacle to such
endorsement. Parker agreed that the Second Circuit's jurisprudence in
the Andrew Jackson cases "permits a school board to employ racial
classifications in programs designed to remedy de facto segregation.'
But Parker went on to note that the program referred to in Brewer had
been in existence for thirty-five years.'92 In that time, the percentage of
minorities in RCSD increased from 25.6% to 80%, and that the current
percentage of white students in the suburban schools ranged from 85%
to 92%." While there were 36,000 students in Rochester, only 580
participated in the program during the 1998-99 school year.!A Parker
stated:
If those statistics are accurate, it is extremely difficult to see how this
program has had any meaningful impact upon the existence of schools
or school districts with "a predominant number or percentage of
students of a particular racial/ethnic group."
Therefore, even though the defendants may have had a sufficiently
compelling interest to justify the program at its inception, it is difficult
388. Id. The Second Circuit rejected the holding of Wessmann stating: "IVessirann relics, we
think wongly, on Supreme Court precedent which holds merely that absent a finding of a
constitutional violation, a school district is under no obligation, enforceable by a federal court, to
remedy the imbalance." Id.
389. Id. at 752.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 753 (Parker, J., concurring).
392. See id. (Parker, J., concurring).
393. See id. at 753-54 (Parker, J., concurring).
394. See id. (Parker, J., concurring).
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to see how the interest continues, given the program's limited impact.
If a compelling interest no longer exists, it seems to me that the entire
program may fail as being unconstitutional, and the plaintiffs would
have no remedy. This aspect of the appeal is one which apparently was
not explored by the court below because the plaintiffs made no facial
challenge to the program as a whole. Given the very limited
development of this issue on the record before us, I believe that a
remand for further consideration is the appropriate disposition.",
Thus, Parker's concurring opinion suggests that given the limited impact
of the plan, it may not advance the compelling interest of reducing racial
isolation.
E. Conclusion
None of the recent court of appeals cases addressing the use of
racial classifications to promote integrated student bodies viewed the
Supreme Court's school desegregation jurisprudence as applicable. Only
the First Circuit in its opinion in Wessmann v. Gittens396 specifically
discussed the apparent recognition of broad powers of state and local
school authorities mentioned by the Supreme Court.3 It dismissed this
language by concluding that those statements were mere dicta.3 9'
With the possible exception of the Second Circuit opinion in
Brewer, these later courts have eviscerated the broad powers of state and
local school officials to use racial classifications to foster integrated
students bodies. Most of these courts of appeals cases demonstrate that
lower federal courts have consistently treated the application of racial
classifications by public schools attempting to promote integrated
classrooms the same way that they would treat the use of racial
classifications by government to a non-public elementary and secondary
education context.39 The primary criticism this Article raises about the
395. Id. at 754 (Parker, J., concurring).
396. 160 F.3d 790 (Ist Cir. 1998).
397. See id. at 796-97.
398. See id. at 797.
399. See Wessmann v. Boston Sch. Comm., 996 F. Supp. 120, 127-28 (D. Mass. 1998)
(upholding the racial classification contained in the admissions policy). The district court
specifically noted that it was dealing with
government's compelling interest in achieving diversity within the unique context of
public intermediate and secondary school education. This litigation is not about the place
of diversity in the work place, the market place, or in graduate education. Here, we are
focusing on the obligation of a school district to determine what policies and practices
will best prepare its children to succeed in a competitive and diverse society.
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courts of appeals decisions is their failure to interpret the use of racial
classifications in light of the special environment of public elementary
and secondary schools.4"
IV. SUPREME COURT'S PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
EDUCATION JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of Education?'
struck down state statutes that segregated students in public schools.
This opinion was just the first of what became a developing
jurisprudence regarding the application of the Equal Protection Clause to
public elementary and secondary schools. The Court's developing
jurisprudence in the field of public school segregation is well chronicled.
Only a brief survey is necessary here.
While the Court addressed issues springing from their opinion in
Brown in a number of cases,' 03 the Court's next major decision in its
school desegregation jurisprudence was the 1968 opinion in Green r.
County School Board.4N In this opinion, the Court concluded that public
schools were under an obligation to take account of race and ethnicity in
order to integrate their schools. s Thus, the Court moved beyond Brown
and required that public schools actually take account of race and
ethnicity in order to integrate their schools. In the 1971 opinion in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,/ the Court
placed upon school systems an obligation to obtain the maximum degree
400. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 804, 807-09. I want to draw particular attention to the
discussion by the First Circuit in Wessnan addressing the narrowly tailored aspect of the remedial
justification offered by the Boston School Committee. See id. at 807. The First Circuit noted that the
use of racial classifications as compensation for the harm inflicted on African American and
I-ispanic students by low teacher expectations was not narrowly tailored enough because a number
of these students had attended private and parochial schools. See id. at 808. As a result. the) could
not be said to be victimized by the low teacher expectations that might exist with black and Latino
students in Boston's elementary schools. This position appears to reject even the broad povwcrs that
the Supreme Court granted to federal courts to remedy the effects of de jure segregation. School
desegregation decrees often involved the rights of students who were not in public schools during
the time that the official misconduct occurred. Thus, many of the blacks and Latinos %-ho were used
to remedy de jure segregation were not victims of the state and school officials' prior
unconstitutional conduct. If the Supreme Court had so narrowly construed the remedial powers of
federal courts responding to de jure segregation, then much of the public school integration that
occurred in America as a result of federal court mandate would not have happened.
401. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
402. See id. at 493-96.
403. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
404. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
405. See id. at 437-48.
406. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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of integration possible.O In doing so, the Court approved busing as a
means to further integrated schools.4 8 The Court then drew its
distinction between de jure segregation and de facto segregation in the
1973 case of Keyes v. School District No. 1.409 In 1974, the Court then
limited the scope of school desegregation decrees in Milliken v.
Bradley,4 '0 and in 1976 the Court made it clear that once a school system
had desegregated it was not under an obligation to continue year-to-year
adjustments in public schools.4" The Court has also addressed issues
regarding the termination of school desegregation decrees in Board of
Education v. Dowell,412 Freeman v. Pitts, 43 and Missouri v. Jenkins.
14
In none of the school desegregation cases did the Court ever reject
the grant of broad powers to school officials it first discussed in Swann.
The only Supreme Court opinion since City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Co.4 15 that addressed the use of racial classifications in public elementary
and secondary education absent a need to remedy an allegation of de jure
segregation was Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.416 The Supreme
Court rejected the use of race as the determinative factor in the layoff of
a white teacher.47 This decision appears to be one limited to the
substantial rights that an individual possesses in their employment,
rather than a rejection of the use of racial classifications to promote
integration.4 1' The use of racial classifications to terminate a particular
public school teacher involves far more vested and important rights of an
individual than using racial classifications to determine admissions of
students to particular schools.
407. See id. at 15-16.
408. See id. at 29-3 1.
409. 413 U.S. 189,208 (1973).
410. 418 U.S. 717,752-53 (1974).
411. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1976). I have argued
on another occasion that the Supreme Court's school desegregation jurisprudence is consistent with
the view that the harm of school segregation was the impact on the socializing process of public
schools. That the harm that seemed to animate the line drawing process of what constituted a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause and what did not was a belief that segregation of public
schools inculcated an invidious value that African Americans were inferior. For a further discussion,
see Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation: Determination of Unitary Status
Based on the Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
412. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
413. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
414. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
415. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
416. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
417. See id. at 283-84.
418. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1567 (3d Cir. 1996).
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Understanding Wygant as a case speaking more to the issue of
vested rights that a public school teacher has in his or her continued
employment-as opposed to the use of racial classifications to
encourage integrated education-is consistent with the case law. The
Sixth Circuit rejected equal protection challenges by public school
teachers who were reassigned to different public schools in order to
foster integrated faculties after the Supreme Court's decision in
Wygayzt.4 9 The transfers were not dictated by a need to remedy de jure
segregation. The lower federal courts have found that despite WVgant,
public school officials still maintain broad powers to foster integrated
faculties.
As noted above, despite the Supreme Court's silence, many recent
lower federal courts have rejected the deference accorded state and local
school officials in the use of racial classifications to foster integrated
student bodies. The most obvious argument justifying the position of
recent federal court decisions is that the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause changed. Since the Court's decision in
Swann, almost thirty years ago, the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence has been developed and refined. The Court has moved
beyond its willingness to embrace racial classifications in the application
of the Equal Protection Clause outside the field of public education. A
cursory reading of the Supreme Court's equal protection decisions over
the past thirty years demonstrates that a government's ability to use
racial classifications is extremely limited. This development culminated
with the Court's opinions in Citv of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,4
Miller v. Johnson,4 ' and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena."
A potent argument could be advanced that even if the Supreme
Court of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s would have deferred to state and
local school officials' decisions to use racial classifications to avoid
racial isolation, end de facto segregation, or to maintain racially and
ethnically integrated schools, that deference no longer exists. The
Supreme Court's equal protection decisions in the 1980s and 1990s have
rejected the apparent deference that it once granted school officials in its
early school desegregation jurisprudence. In the 1950s, the Supreme
Court's equal protection jurisprudence changed and came to reject the
doctrine of "separate but equal." Now, that jurisprudence has changed
419. See Jacobson v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 961 F.2d 100. 103 (6th Cir. 1992); see also
supra note 84.
420. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
421. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
422. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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again. If the use of racial classifications for the purpose of fostering
integrated student bodies does not offend the Equal Protection Clause,
there must be something in the role of public education that
differentiates it from other governmental services.
There were actually two different roads that led away from the
Court's opinion in Brown. The opinion in Brown was not only a turning
point for the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, it was also a turning
point for the Court's public school jurisprudence.4 3
It is beyond dispute that since the Supreme Court's early school
desegregation cases, its equal protection jurisprudence has developed.
But the Court's jurisprudence regarding the role and purpose of public
elementary and secondary education has also developed. Since Brown
was decided, a number of Supreme Court opinions have recognized that
constitutional rights must be adapted to the special nature of public
elementary and secondary education. The Supreme Court has articulated
different tests to determine violations of students' free speech rights
under the First Amendment424 and privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment' 25 from those that are applied outside of the context of
public education.
While recognizing that students have state created property and
liberty interests in public education that is protected by the Due Process
Clause, the court has interpreted the requirements for a due process
hearing to be minimal when a school official seeks to invade those
rights. The Supreme Court has often applied the Lemon test to resolve
Establishment Clause challenges to governmental actions in both public
education and outside of public education. 426 It is only in the context of
disputes about public education, however, that the Supreme Court has
relied solely on the purpose prong of the Lemon test to strike down
governmental actions.427 The Supreme Court has also determined that in
light of the special characteristics of the public school environment the
423. See supra text accompanying note 12.
424. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503,513 (1969).
425. See Vemonia Sch, Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
426. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 581, 583, 585, 612 (1987) (striking down a
statute requiring teachers to teach creation science whenever they taught the theory of evolution);
wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-56 (1985) (striking down an Alabama statute authorizing a one
minute period of silence for meditation or prayer); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per
curiam) (striking down a statute providing for posting of the Ten Commandments, paid for by
private funds, on the walls of each public classroom in Kentucky).
427. See, e.g., supra note 16.
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right to receive information-which is a corollary of the rights of free
speech and press-is also applied differently."! Even the equal
protection rights of resident aliens who seek employment as public
school teachers are determined differently from how they are determined
for most other governmental occupations::
The special nature of public elementary and secondary education
that justifies the modification of constitutional rights when applied to
public schools is derived from the fact that they are transmitters of
societal values to the young. As the Supreme Court has stated, the
primary objectives of public education is the "inculcatlion of]
fundamental values" for "the maintenance of a democratic political
system."4 0 Thus, when government is acting as educator of the young it
is performing a sui generis governmental service.
This Section discusses the Supreme Court's jurisprudence dealing
with the application of constitutional rights in public elementary and
secondary schools. The Supreme Court based its decision to vary
constitutional rights on three overlapping concerns involving public
elementary and secondary education that do not normally exist outside
of the educational context. First, when addressing constitutional rights of
students, the Court is dealing with the rights of minors. The Court has
noted in a number of decisions that the rights of minors are different
from adults. Second, the Supreme Court has recognized that for public
schools to effectively teach the lessons that students must learn, it is
necessary that they be able to maintain appropriate discipline. Third, the
Court has recognized that the primary purpose of public education is the
inculcation of fundamental values necessary for the maintenance of our
democratic society. Therefore, in determining the application of
constitutional rights in public schools, the values being socialized are of
utmost concern.
A. Supreme Court Decisions Varying Students' Rights Based
on the Distinction Between Adults and Minors
The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the constitutional
rights of minors differ from those of adults. 3' The reasons for this
difference are obvious.42 Minors lack the experience, maturity,
428. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico em reL Pico, 457 U.S. 853.867-68 (1982).
429. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68. 80 (1979).
430. Id. at77.
431. Se4 e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634(1979).
432. The Supreme Court has "recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the
constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnrability of
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judgment, and cognitive development of adults. Because of their
infancy, they do not possess the same capacity for self-determination.
The cognitive development of children makes value inculcation of them
inevitable. Children must go through a maturation process during which
they will have experiences and develop perspectives that will indelibly
affect their view of themselves, their fellow citizens, their country, and
their world.
In Lee v. Weisman4 33 the Supreme Court concluded that a non-
sectarian prayer delivered by a rabbi at a public high school graduation
ceremony violated the Establishment Clause .4 Nine years earlier, in
Marsh v. Chambers,'4 35 however, the Supreme Court approved the
opening of a session of a state legislature with a prayer.36 In response to
the argument that Marsh applied, the Weisman Court noted that
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is "fact-sensitive. ' 7 Therefore, it
could not accept the argument that the Court's decision in Marsh applied
in the public school context.438 The Court rested its decision on the
assertion that even remaining silent during the religious ceremony
carried the "risk of indirect coercion. 439 What to most believers may
seem nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbelievers
respect the religious practices of others, in a school context may appear
to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the state to enforce a
religious orthodoxy."0 Students attending a high school graduation
ceremony are subjected to both public and peer pressure "to stand as a
group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the invocation and
benediction." ' While it is true that this may only signify to some that
they are simply being respectful of the religious beliefs of others, a
student of high school age may have "a reasonable perception that [he
or] she is being forced by the State to pray.' " 2 The Court concluded
"that for many, if not most, of the students at the graduation, the act of
children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in child rearing." Id.
433. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
434. See id. at 599.
435. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
436. See id. at 786.
437. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 597.
438. See id.
439. See id. at 592.
440. See id. at 593.
441. Id.
442. Id.
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standing or remaining silent was an expression of participation in the
rabbi's prayer.' 44
In Venwnia School District v. Acton, " the Court upheld a drug
testing policy adopted by the Vernonia School Board that applied to all
students participating in interscholastic athletics.'"5 While the Court had
upheld drug testing of employees in certain industries, it had not gone so
far as to uphold drug testing as a requirement for participating in any
particular governmental program."5 In justifying the Court's decision to
uphold the drug testing policy, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court noted
that:
Traditionally at common law, and still today, unemancipated
minors lack some of the most fundamental rights of self-
determination-including even the right of liberty in its narrow sense,
i.e., the right to come and go at will. They are subject, even as to their
physical freedom, to the control of their parents or guardians."
Scalia went on to note that "Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public schools than
elsewhere; the 'reasonableness' inquiry [of the Fourth Amendment]
cannot disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for
children.""5
B. Supreme Court Decisions Vat3'ing Students' Rights
Based on the Concern About the Requirements
for Appropriate Discipline
The Court has focused on the need for public schools to maintain
appropriate discipline as the principal justification for a number of its
decisions defining the constitutional rights of students in public schools.
This was the primary aspect of public education that the Supreme Court
relied upon when it first defined the application of the Free Speech
443. Id.
444. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
Students wishing to play sports must sign a form consenting to the testing and must
obtain the written consent of their parents. Athletes are tested at the beginning of the
season for their sport. In addition, once each week of the season the names of the athletes
are placed in a "pool" from wvhich a student, with the supervision of tw o adults, blindly
draws the names of 10% of the athletes for random testing. Those selected are notified
and tested that same day, if possible.
Id. at 650.
445. See id. at 664-65.
446. See id. at 653-54.
447. Id. at 654.
448. Id. at 656.
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Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Fourth Amendment's
restrictions against unreasonable searches and seizures to public schools.
The Supreme Court first addressed the application of the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment to public schools in its landmark
case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.
In Tinker, a group of adults and students in Des Moines, Iowa decided to
"publicize their objections to the hostilities in Vietnam ... by wearing
black armbands." 5 After becoming aware of this plan, principals of Des
Moines' public schools adopted a regulation to prevent the wearing of
the armbands.45' When the students wore the black armbands to their
schools, they were suspended until they came back without the
armbands.452 In addressing the students' freedom of speech challenge to
the principals' policy, the Supreme Court noted that "[n]either students
[n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate., 453 The Court noted, however, that it
"has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive
authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct
in the schools."4 Thus, those First Amendment rights must be applied in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment' The
Court then laid down a special rule to apply to the determination of
infringements on the right of free speech in the context of public
education. In order to suppress student speech, school officials must
demonstrate that the speech would 'materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school.'
456
In a 1975 opinion, Goss v. Lopez,57 the Supreme Court first
addressed the issue of the application of the Due Process Clause to
public education.45' The case involved suspensions of students from
public schools for a period not exceeding ten days.459 The Court agreed
that the students possessed a state created property interest in their right
449. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
450. Id. at 504.
451. Seeid.
452. See id.
453. Id. at 506.
454. Id. at 507.
455. See id.
456. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
457. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
458. See id. at 572-73.
459. See id. at 567.
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to receive public education, which could not be taken away absent their
misconduct, and a liberty interest in their reputation that would be
damaged by a suspension for less than ten days due to misconduct. 'O
The Court noted that these property and liberty deprivations were
protected by the Due Process Clause:t"
In determining what process was due, the Court weighed the
interest of the student with that of the school. The Court noted that
"[s]ome modicum of discipline and order is essential if the educational
function is to be performed. Events calling for discipline are frequent
occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action.
Suspension is considered not only to be a necessary tool to maintain
order but a valuable educational device."6 The Court held that students
facing suspensions of ten days or less "be given oral or written notice of
the charges against [them] and, if [they] den[y] them, an explanation of
the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present [their]
side of the story."' ' 3 The Court, however, stopped short of requiring that
students be given "the opportunity to secure counsel, to confront and
cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, or to call" witnesses on
their own behalf.4 The Court noted that to do so would not only be too
costly, but would also destroy suspensions as an effective part of the
teaching process. 5
Two years after its decision in Goss, the Supreme Court once again
addressed the application of the Due Process Clause to discipline
procedures by public schools. In Ingrahan v. WrightC6 students argued
that the Due Process Clause required that they be presented with notice
and an opportunity to be heard before corporal punishment was
inflicted.0 The Court refused to find a right to a pre-paddling hearing in
the Due Process Clause.4s In justifying their decision, the Court pointed
to the fact that granting such a hearing would interfere with the school
460. See id. at 574.
461. See id.
462. Id. at 580.
463. Id. at 581.
464. Id. at 583.
465. See id. The Court did suggest that longer suspensions might require extra procedural
requirements. See id. at 584.
466. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
467. See id. at 653. The students also argued that the Eighth Ameandm ns prohibition against
cruel and inhumane punishment applied to school officials. See id. at 668. Thus, corparal
punishment violated the student's Eighth Amendment rights. See id. at 668-69. The Court rejected
this argument, stating that "[a]n examination of the history of the [Eighth] Amendment ... [nmizd it
clear] that it was designed [only] to protect those convicted of crimes:' Id. at 664.
468. See id. at 682.
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authorities' disciplinary measures.4 '69 The disruption and procedural
burden of a hearing might force school authorities to use less effective
measures to maintain appropriate student discipline.4 10
In the 1985 case of New Jersey v. T.L.O.,47' the Supreme Court first
addressed the application of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures to public school students47 1
State and lower federal courts had struggled with the proper resolution
of privacy rights of students and the interest of the states in providing an
appropriate environment conducive to education. In resolving this
tension, some state courts held that school officials conducting in-school
searches of students were acting in loco parenti.473 Since school officials
derived their power to discipline students from the students' parents or
guardians, they were legally acting as private individuals. As a result, the
Fourth Amendment did not apply to the conduct of school officials. On
the other extreme, at least one court held that the Fourth Amendment
fully applies to in-school searches.4 74 Thus, a search conducted by a
school official without probable cause is unreasonable.
After rejecting the in loco parentis argument and concluding that
the Fourth Amendment applied to school officials, Justice White's
opinion addressed the question of the standard that should govern school
searches. Justice White noted that the standard of reasonableness
governing any specific class of searches requires "'balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails."' 476 Due to the
substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining
469. See id. at 680.
470. See id.
471. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
472. See id. at 333.
473. See, e.g., R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex. App. 1983); Mercer v. State, 450
S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). But see, e.g., D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252, 255 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1982) (noting that in loco parentis "has little utility in describing contemporary
compulsory public education"); In re G., 90 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364 (Ct. App. 1970) (relying not on in
loco parentis, but instead on a constitutional analysis that gives the state power to control the
conduct of children that exceeds the scope of permissible control over adults).
474. See State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317,319 (La.), vacated by 423 U.S. 809 (1975).
475. See T.LO., 469 U.S. at 337, 341-42. In T.LO., New Jersey argued that the Fourth
Amendment was intended to regulate only searches and seizures carried out by law enforcement
officers. See id. at 334. Justice White rejected this argument, stating that the "Court has never
limited the [Fourth] Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures to operations
conducted by the police." Id. at 335. Because "the Court has long spoken of the Fourth
Amendment's strictures as restraints imposed upon 'governmental action'--that is, 'upon the
activities of sovereign authority,"' he concluded that the Fourth Amendment applied to public
school authorities as well. Id. (quoting Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465,475 (1921)).
476. Id. at 337 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
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discipline in the classroom and on school grounds, White stated "[i]t is
evident that the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to
which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.' '" White
went on to state:
We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in
concluding that the accommodation of the privacy interests of
schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators
for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict
adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause
to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the
law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply
on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the searchYr
C. The Supreme Court's Decisions Varying Students' Rights
Based on Value Izculcation by Public Schools
The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that an objective of public
education is the inculcation of fundamental values necessary for the
maintenance of a democratic political system.t  Viewing public
477. Id. at 340.
478. Id. at 341 (footnote omitted).
479. See Hazehvood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260. 272. 274-75 11988) (noting the
importance of public elementary and secondary schools in awakzening children to cultural values);
id. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that public elementary and secondary schoals
"inculcate[] in tomorrow's leaders the 'fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system .... ' All the while, the public educator nurtures students' social and
moral development by transmitting to them an official dogma of '"community values"'") (quoting
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico ex rel. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 6S, 77
(1979)) (citations omitted) (third alteration in original).
The role and purpose of the American public school system was well described by to
historians, who stated: "[Plublic education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the
Republic.... It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves
conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the
community and the nation." In Ambach v. Nonrsick, we echoed the essence of this
statement of the objectives of public education as the "inculcat[ion of] fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675. 681 (1986) (quoting CiiARL.ES A. BEARD &
MARY R. BEARD, NeIv BAsIc HtSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)) (citations omitted)
(alterations in original). See also Pico er rel Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (stating that the Court "halsl...
acknowledged that public [elementary and secondary] schools are vitally important... vehicles for
'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system'")
(quoting Anbach, 441 U.S. at 76-77); id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring) I"[ilhe Court has
acknowledged the importance of the public [elementary and secondary] schools 'in the ...
preservation of the values on which our society rests.' Because of the essential socializing function
of schools, local education officials... 'awake[n the child to cultural values.'") (quoting Arbach,
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education as a value inculcating institution for the young is reflected in a
number of Supreme Court cases addressing the constitutional rights
applied in the context of public education. The Court specifically
referred to the socializing aspect of public education as the basis of its
two decisions addressing the free speech rights of students in public
schools after Tinker.480 In determining that an equal protection challenge
by an alien should be analyzed by applying the rational relationship test
instead of strict scrutiny, the Court also rested on the value inculcating
function of public education.4 ' The Court's concern about the values
being inculcated to public school students also explains why it often
focuses on the motives of school officials when determining the
constitutionality of a given action. The best way to determine the
message being conveyed by a given act, statute, or regulation by state or
school officials, and therefore the values being inculcated, is to focus on
the precipitating motives. Finally, the Supreme Court's school
desegregation termination cases have made the good faith of school
officials a factor to be considered in terminating court decrees. The
preoccupation with good faith suggests a concern about schools' value
inculcating mission.
1. Free Speech Cases
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,412 the Court upheld a
free speech challenge to the authority of school officials to discipline a
student for delivering an address at a student assembly that made
suggestive use of vulgar and offensive terms.483 Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Burger noted that the Court had previously "upheld the
right to express an antidraft viewpoint in a public place ... in terms
441 U.S. at 76; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)) (citations omitted) (last alteration
in original); Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion stated the following:
The idea that ... students have a right of access, in the school, to information other than
that thought by their educators to be necessary is contrary to the very nature of an
inculcative education. Education consists of the selective presentation and explanation of
ideas.... Thus, Justice Brennan cannot rely upon the nature of school libraries to escape
the fact that the First Amendment right to receive information simply has no application
to the one public institution which, by its very nature, is a place for the selective
conveyance of ideas.
Id. at 914-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76 ("The importance of public
[elementary and secondary] schools.., in the preservation of the values on which our society rests,
long has been recognized by our decisions ....").
480. See, e.g., Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272, 274-75.
481. See Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76-77.
482. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
483. See id. at 680.
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highly offensive to most citizens." 4' However, Burger stated that the
degree of freedom the government grants to adults making political
points does not have to be granted to public school children. - Before a
court can grant freedom to students to espouse controversial beliefs
while at school, a court must consider the need to teach the children how
to behave properly in society." Burger cited with approval the purposes
of the American public school system set forth by Charles and Mary
Beard.4 1 The Court had previously echoed the Beards' sentiments when
it stated that "'inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system"' was at root of the
purposes of public education.""
The role and purpose of the American public school system [was]
well described by two historians, who stated: "[Plublic education must
prepare [students] for citizenship .... It must inculcate the habits and
manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and
as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community
and nation".... In Ambach v. Nonvick, we echoed the essence of this
statement of the objectives of public education as the "inculcatiion of]
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system."s
Burger stated that "fundamental values.., essential to a democratic
society must ... include tolerance of divergent political and religious
views, even when the views expressed may be unpopular."4", However,
Burger went on to note that the right to express unpopular views in
public schools "must be balanced against the society's countervailing
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior.""49 Burger continued:
Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education
to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.
484. Id. at 682.
485. See id. (noting "that the constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings" '.
486. Seeid.at681.
487. See idU (noting the Beards' assertion that the public schools must ready students for
citizenship by teaching the students the requiremants of civility that are needed to ensure propar
self-government) (citing CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD. NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
488. Id (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68.76-77 t19791) (alteration in originall.
489. Id. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick. 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (19791) (alterations in originall
(citations omitted).
490. Id
491. Id.
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Indeed, the "fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system" disfavor the use of terms of debate highly
offensive or highly threatening to others. Nothing in the Constitution
prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are
inappropriate and subject to sanctions.4
The Chief Justice concluded that the job of teaching these values
belongs to the schools.
493
In another free speech case, Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,49 the Court addressed content-based censorship by a school
principal of articles that were to appear in a student newspaper.49' In the
opinion for the Court, Justice White noted that the school newspaper
involved an activity that might reasonably be considered a part of the
school curriculum. 496 Educators are entitled to control student expression
in these activities in order to ensure that students learn the lessons they
should derive from the activities. 4 Thus, the
school must... retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech
that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use,
irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with "the shared
values of a civilized social order," or to associate the school with any
position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy.498
In upholding the principal's decision to censor the articles, the Court
articulated a test that was easier for school officials to meet than the one
it articulated in Tinker: "It is only when the decision to censor a school-
sponsored publication, theatrical production, or other vehicle of student
expression has no valid educational purpose that the First Amendment
... require[s] judicial intervention to protect students' constitutional
rights."499
492. Id. at 683 (quoting Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76-77).
493. See id.
494. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
495. See id. at 262.
496. Seeid. at271.
497. See id.
498. Id. at 272 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986))
(citation omitted). The Court also rested its opinion on the fact that "school[s] must [also] be able to
take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in determining whether to
disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics." Id.
499. Id. at 273 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
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2. Equal Protection Case
In Ambach v. Nonvick,5 the Court addressed an equal protection
challenge to a New York law that "forb[ade] certification as a public
school teacher [to] any person who [was] not a citizen of the United
States, unless that person ... manifested an intention to apply."'' '
Although classifications based on alienage are normally inherently
suspect, there are exceptions for state functions that are intimately tied to
the operation of the state as a governmental entity.7' Resting on the
importance of public education in socializing students, the Court
determined that teaching in public schools was one of these state
functions.". As such, the challenge by resident aliens was not to be
analyzed under strict scrutiny, but under the more relaxed rational
relationship test.""
3. Prevalence of the Use of Governmental Motive Analysis in
Public Education
The Supreme Court has often used motive tests to determine the
constitutionality of various governmental actions involving issues in
public education.5" The reason that it makes sense for the Court to focus
on motives of state and local school officials that generate a given rule,
regulation, decision, or statute is because of public education's value
inculcating function. Public schools have historically been the institution
that inculcated local consensus community values to the young. The
focus on the motivations of school officials that precipitate certain
actions is an appropriate way to determine the messages being
conveyed-and thus, the values being inculcated to public school
students-by a given governmental action.07 Therefore, the prevalence
of the use of motive tests to determine infringements on constitutional
500. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
501. Id. at 69-70.
502. See id. at 73-74.
503. See id. at 76-80.
504. See id. at 80. The Court also noted the importance of the value inculcating function of
public schools. See id. at 77. See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202. 22 n.20 (19S21 istating
that the "the significance of education to our society is not limited to its political and cultural fruits.
The public schools are an important socializing institution, imparting those shared values through
which social order and stability are maintained"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 113 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that "[e]ducation serves the essential function
of instilling in our young an understanding of and appreciation for the principles and opzration of
our governmental processes").
505. Se4 e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico e& rel Pico, 457 U.S. 853.871 (1982); Lemon v. Kutzmmn
403 U.S. 602,612 (1971).
506. SeeAmbach, 441 U.S. at76.
507. See id. at 78-79.
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rights in public education is also a recognition of the importance of
public education's value inculcating function.
The Supreme Court has long noted that governmental action can be
struck down as violating the Establishment Clause when there is no
secular motive."8 The first cases where the Supreme Court relied solely
on the lack of a secular purpose to strike a given governmental action,
however, all occurred in the context of disputes involving public
education. In Epperson v. Arkansas," the Court struck down a 1928
state law that prohibited the teaching of the theory of evolution in its
public schools and universities.' The Court noted that the law "was a
product of [an] upsurge of 'fundamentalist' religious fervor of the
twenties. 51 2 In concluding that the law violated the Establishment
Clause, the Court stated that "[t]he overriding fact is that Arkansas' law
selects from the body of knowledge a particular segment which it
proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict ... with a
particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious
group."5 '3 In Stone v. Graham,14 the Court struck down a Kentucky
statute providing for posting of the Ten Commandments, paid for by
private funds, on the wall of each classroom in public schools."' In
determining that the statute violated the Establishment Clause,"6 the
Court stated: "We conclude that Kentucky's statute requiring the posting
of the Ten Commandments in public school rooms has no secular
legislative purpose, and is therefore unconstitutional."5 '7 In Wallace v.
Jaffree,5 8 the Court struck down an Alabama statute authorizing a
moment of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer. '9 In doing so, the
Court noted that "the record ... reveals that the enactment of [section]
16-1-20.1 [the statute under consideration] was not motivated by any
clearly secular purpose-indeed, the statute had no secular purpose.
520
508. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
509. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITTIONAL LAW § 14-9, at 1206 (2d ed.
1988).
510. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
511. Seeid. at 103.
512. Id. at 98.
513. Id. at 103.
514. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
515. See id. at 39-41.
516. Seeid. at40-41.
517. Id. at41.
518. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
519. Seeid. at40,61.
520. Id. at 56.
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In Edwards v. Aguillard,2 the Court struck down Louisiana's "Balanced
Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution Science in Public School
Instruction" Act.- Aware of the Court's decision in Epperson, the
Louisiana legislature passed an Act requiring that anytime public
schools presented the theory of evolution they must also present the
scientific evidence that justified creationism.5 3 Those who implemented
the Act indicated that its purpose was to protect academic freedom;"' a
purpose the Court found to be a sham:- In applying only the purpose
prong of the Lemon test 6 the Court stated that in this case, the
petitioners "have identified no clear secular purpose for the Louisiana
Act., ,
527
The Court's latest school prayer decision of Sante Fe Independent
School District v. Doe M addressed a school board regulation which
authorized student led prayer at high school football games. ' The Court
analyzed the regulation under the principles it enunciated in Weisnan.,73
Thus, the Court concluded that participation in a benediction at a high
school football game amounts to coerced participation in a religious
ceremony.'' The Court also noted, however, that given the history of
prayer at sporting events in the Santa Fe School District, the adoption of
the current version of the school board regulation was motivated by a
religious purpose."
In Board of Education v. Pico ex reL Pico,53 the Court addressed
the removal of controversial books from a public school library by
521. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
522. See id. at 580-82.
523. Seeid. at581.
524. See id.
525. See id. at 582.
526. "'The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to
endorse or disapprove of religion."' Id. at 585 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 663, 690
(1984)) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
527. Id. at 585.
528. 120 S. CL 2266 (U.S. 2000).
529. Seeid. 2275.
530. See id. at 2273.
531. See id. at 2274,2275.
532. See id. at 2277. The Court also noted that "[t]he policy is invalid on its fLee Lz-caus it
establishes an improper majoritarian election on religion, and unquestionably has the purpofe and
creates the perception of encouraging the delivery of prayer at a series of important school evcnts."
Id. at 2283. But the Court also noted in its analysis "in light of the school's histotr, of regular
delivery of a student-led prayer at athletic events, it is reasonable to infer that the specific purpoe
of the policy was to preserve a popular 'state-sponsored religious practice.'" Id. at 2279 (quoting
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)).
533. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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school officials.5 Justice Brennan, writing for a three-justice plurality,
"acknowledged that public schools are vitally important... vehicles for
'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system."'535 He went on to conclude that students
possess a right to receive information.36 This right is violated when the
school officials use their discretion to remove books from a school
library in a narrowly partisan or political manner. 37 If the school
officials' decision to remove the books is because they conclude that the
books are "pervasively vulgar" or because the books are determined not
to be 'educationally suitab[le],"' then the motives are not
unconstitutional. 38 In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun also
adopted a similar motive test.539 Blackmun also noted "the importance of
the [socializing function of] public schools 'in the... preservation of the
values on which our society rests. '"''  To him, "certain forms of state
discrimination between ideas are improper."' Thus, "the State may not
... deny access to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of
[it] for partisan or political reasons."" 2 The primary difference between
the student right recognized by Brennan and that recognized by
Blackmun is that Brennan's right to receive information was limited to
removal of books from the school library."3 Blackmun's would apply to
decisions by school officials throughout the entire educational process.,
534. See id. at 855-56.
535. Id. at 864 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
536. See id. at 867.
537. Seeid. at871.
538. Id. (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 53).
539. See id. at 879-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
540. Id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76
(1979)).
541. Id. at 878-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
542. Id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
543. See id. at 879 n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
544. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist's dissent, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Powell, also pointed to the importance of the socializing function of public
schools. See id. at 913-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But for Rehnquist, the school officials did not
engage in any unconstitutional behavior. See id. at 920 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In criticizing
Justice Brennan's assertion that students have a right to read books that their school disapproves of,
Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The idea that... students have a right of access, in the school, to information other than
that thought by their educators to be necessary is contrary to the very nature of an
inculcative education.
Education consists of the selective presentation and explanation of ideas.
... Thus, Justice Brennan cannot rely upon the nature of school libraries to escape
the fact that the First Amendment right to receive information simply has no application
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It is also worth noting that in Keyes v School District No. 1,1" the
Supreme Court drew the line between de facto school segregation that
did not offend the constitution, and de jure segregation that did.!" The
difference between de facto segregation and de jure segregation is that
under the latter the current condition of segregation resulted from
intentional state action directed specifically to segregate the schools.'
4. School Desegregation Termination Cases
Even the Supreme Court's school desegregation termination
jurisprudence suggests that the primary analysis in determining whether
a school system has eradicated the vestiges of its prior de jure conduct is
an analysis that focuses on value inculcation."' The Supreme Court has
addressed the termination of school desegregation decrees in three
cases! 9 In Board of Education v. Dowell,"  the Supreme Court
addressed the issues relating to the termination of school desegregation
decrees.55' In the majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
the Supreme Court held that a school district "was being operated in
compliance with the commands of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that it was unlikely that the Board would
return to its former ways, would be a finding that the purposes of the
desegregation litigation had been fully achieved." 2 The Court indicated
that a desegregation decree is dissolved "after the local authorities have
operated in compliance with it for a reasonable period of time: '"" On
remand, the Court stated, "[tihe District Court should address itself to
whether the Board had complied in good faith with the desegregation
decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past
discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable.""" To
provide further direction as to what factors lower courts should consider
to the one public institution which, by its very nature, is a place for the selective
conveyance of ideas.
Id. at 914-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
545. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
546. See id. at 208.
547. See id.
548. For a more extended discussion of this point, see Kevin Brow,, Has the Supreme Coer
Allowed the Curefor De Jure Segregation to Replicate the Discase?, 78 CORNELL L Rrv. 1. 20-35
(1992).
549. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts. 503 U.S. 467 1992 ; Bd.
of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
550. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
551. Seeid at244.
552. Id. at 247.
553. Id. at 248.
554. Id. at 249-50.
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in determining whether or not a school system has eliminated the
vestiges of de jure segregation, the Supreme Court cited its 1968
opinion,55' Green v. County School Board."1
6
In Freeman v. Pitts,5 " the Court addressed the termination of school
desegregation decrees again. In Dowell, the district court had
relinquished all remedial control over the Oklahoma City School
System. By contrast, in Pitts, the district court had determined that
control could be relinquished only over those aspects of the system in
which the vestiges of the prior discriminatory conduct had been
eradicated.5 ' The district court "retained supervisory authority... [over]
aspects of the school system... not in full compliance." 9 In a majority
opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court agreed with
the district court's conclusion that the Green factors could be considered
separately and that partial relinquishment of supervision and control of a
school system in an appropriate case does not offend the Constitution.""
The Court articulated a three-part test to be used in determining
whether partial withdrawal is warranted:
[W]hether there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the
[court] decree in those aspects of the system where supervision is to be
withdrawn; whether retention of judicial control is necessary or
practicable to achieve compliance with the decree in other facets of the
school system; and whether the school district has demonstrated, to the
public and to the parents and students of the once disfavored race, its
good-faith commitment to the whole of the court's decree and to those
provisions of the law and the Constitution that were the predicate for
judicial intervention in the first instance.-6
562In Jenkins v. Missouri, the district court concluded that Missouri
mandated racially segregated schools prior to 1954 in Kansas City, and
that the Kansas City Metropolitan School District ("KCMSD") and the
state had failed in their affirmative duty to eliminate the vestiges of the
dual school system within KCMSD.563 Pursuant to this determination, the
555. See id. at 250.
556. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
557. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
558. Seeid. at471.
559. Id.
560. See id. at 492-93. Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by
Justices white, Souter, and Scalia. See id. at 470. Justices Scalia and Souter wrote separate
concurring opinions. See id.
561. Id.at491.
562. 593 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
563. See id. at 1488, 1504.
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district court ordered massive increases in educational spending in
Kansas City public schools.5: The district court's desegregation plan had
been "described ... as the most ... expensive remedial program in the
history of school desegregation."5 5 Since the Supreme Court found both
KCMSD and the State of Missouri responsible for the constitutional
violation, it held them "jointly and severally liable" for the cost of the
educational improvements.5 6 The result was that the state "has borne the
brunt of' the financial burden.567
The state challenged the district court's requirement that it fund
salary increases for KCMSD instructional and noninstructional staff for
the 1992-93 school year and the district court's order requiring it to
continue to fund the remedial quality education programs1' "The State
contended that... it had achieved partial unitary status with respect to
the quality education programs already in place." ' - The district court
rejected these challenges, grounding its ruling in the need to remedy
vestiges of segregation by improving the desegregative attractiveness of
KCMSD.-0 Part of the district court's justification for making KCMSD
an attractive school was to attract white students from suburban areas
who would be willing to voluntarily enroll in KCMSD schools to take
advantage of its incredible educational opportunities." The district court
also rested its decision on the continuing need for massive educational
expenditures because student achievement levels in Kansas City were
still at or below the national norms at most grade levels!
The Supreme Court rejected these justifications.' The Court noted
that desegregative attractiveness was not related to the original
constitutional violation because there was no finding of an interdistrict
violation5 4 Since the Court determined in Milliken that an interdistrict
remedy was only justified by an interdistrict violation, the Court's
justification, resting on an effort to attract white suburban students to
KCMSD schools, exceeded its remedial scope. 5 The Court went on to
state that tying the remedial duty to the need to bring student
564. See id. at 1506.
565. Jenkins ex reL Agyei v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393,397 (8th Cir. 1994) (Beam, J., dissenting).
566. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,76 (1995).
567. Id. at 79.
568. See id at 84.
569. Id. at 80 (citation omitted).
570. See id
571. See id at 76.
572. See id. at 83.
573. See idL at 102-03.
574. See iL at 90.
575. See id
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achievement levels in Kansas City to national norms was the wrong
focusY 6 "The basic task ... is to decide whether the reduction in
achievement by minority students attributable to the prior de jure
segregation has been remedied to the extent practicable. ' 71 On remand
the Court indicated that the district court should apply the three-part test
articulated in Freeman.578
The Court's termination cases show that it is not the elimination of
racial imbalance that is the determining factor in eradicating the vestiges
of de jure segregation. Just as a school system could have de facto
segregation and not be in violation of the Constitution, a school system
can eliminate the vestiges of its prior discriminatory conduct, even
though racial imbalance or the potential for a significant increase in
racial imbalance exists at the time that the determination is made. In all
three cases, the Court noted that, as a prerequisite to the termination of
all or part of court supervision, school districts should comply in good
faith with the court decree for a reasonable period of time. 79 The Court
also noted the importance of determining if a school system will return
to engaging in intentionally discriminatory practices. 8 Good faith
compliance and assurances that the school system will not return to its
former discriminatory ways are actually examinations that are directed
towards interpreting the sincerity of the school district in eradicating de
jure segregation. The Court is asking the school district to show that its
attitude towards African Americans, and hence the meaning attached to
its actions affecting them, has changed. In other words, the district must
prove that it is no longer acting under an assumption that African
Americans are inferior when it formulates its policies and programs.
D. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's education jurisprudence makes it clear that
the Court has interpreted constitutional rights in light of the special
environment of public education. This general view of education has
shifted the emphasis in educational disputes "from a rights-based to a
values-based ideology." 8' Thus, the Court's determination of
576. See id. at 100, 101.
577. Id. at 101.
578. See id.
579. See id. at 89; Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 498 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498
U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991).
580. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 101; Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491-92; Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249.
581. Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voices of
Dissent, 14 YALEL. & POL'Y REV. 169, 186 (1996).
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constitutional rights outside of the context of public education does not
necessarily dictate their scope within the special environment of public
education.
V. EXAMINATION OF THE USE OF RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS TO
PRODUCE INTEGRATED SCHOOLS GIVEN THE SPECIAL
ENVIRONMENT OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
In Brown, the Supreme Court concluded that the use of racial
classifications to segregate students violated the Equal Protection
Clause. In addressing one of the companion cases of Brown on remand,
a three-judge federal district court in South Carolina wrote:
[The Supreme Court] has not decided that the states must mix persons
of different races in the schools or must require them to attend schools
or must deprive them of the right of choosing the schools they attend.
What it has decided, and all that it has decided, is that a state may not
deny to any person on account of race the right to attend any school
that it maintains... . The Constitution, in other words, does not require
integration. It merely forbids discrimination. It does not forbid such
segregation as occurs as the result of voluntary action. It merely
forbids the use of governmental power to enforce segregation.F
But, in Green v. County School Board,5" the Court put an "affirmative
duty [on the public schools] to take whatever steps might be necessary"
to eliminate the vestiges of its prior discriminatory conduct "root and
branch." ' The Court rejected the argument that non-racial means could
be instituted to remedy the harm of de jure segregation if they did not
produce integrated schools.5 ' Thus, the Supreme Court cases that have
directly addressed the use of racial classification by public schools on
students have found that their use to further segregation is
unconstitutional, but that their use may be required in order to remedy an
equal protection violation. From this it is clear that the use by public
582. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776,777 (E.D.S.C. 1955). The Suprem Court's opinion in
Brown required public schools "to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school
system." Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). The precise parameters of what vwas
meant by a racially nondiscriminatory school system were originally left to the discretion of school
authorities who had "the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and soling [this]
problem." Id. at 299. Many southern federal judges and school officials implementing this
obligation relied upon the dictum in Briggs to fill the vacuum left by the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855, 864 (E.D. Ark. 1956). Consequently, they do not pursue
integration, but merely ban compelled segregation.
583. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
584. Id. at 437-38.
585. See id.at 440.
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schools of racial classifications does not amount to a per se equal
protection violation.
Reflecting the concern about the special environment of education
changes the focus of the analysis of the use of racial classifications on
students by public schools from what it would be in a non-public
elementary and secondary educational context. The fundamental
question becomes, are the messages being sent, and thereby the values
being inculcated by the use of racial classifications, consistent with the
values derived from the Equal Protection Clause? Consistent with strict
scrutiny, public schools have a compelling state interest in inculcating
the values derived from the Equal Protection Clause. The use of racial
classifications to advance those values in the context of voluntary
integration programs is narrowly tailored.
Two issues must be addressed in order to determine whether the use
of racial classifications to further an integrated student body pursuant to
a voluntary school desegregation program violates the Equal Protection
Clause. First, we must understand the fundamental values derived from
the Equal Protection Clause that should be inculcated by public schools.
Second, we must determine if the messages being sent by the use of
racial classifications to promote voluntarily integrated student bodies are
consistent with those values.
A. Values Derived from the Equal Protection Clause
The Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence has often
focused on the harms associated with a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. By examining harms produced by equal protection violations,
the values derived from the Equal Protection Clause can be ascertained.
Justice Powell, in his opinion in Regents of University of California
v. Bakke,586 mentioned a number of potential harms generated by the use
of racial classifications. He noted that the use of racial classifications
may "validate burdens imposed upon individual members of a particular
group in order to advance the group's general interest.""58 Thus, a black
person's individual interest may be sacrificed for the benefit of his or her
race or ethnicity. Powell also noted that racial classifications may
"forc[e] innocent persons ... to bear the burdens of redressing
grievances" they did not cause:" As a result, an innocent white person
may be excluded from a governmental program to address a societal ill.
586. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
587. Id. at 298.
588. Id.
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Another harm that Powell noted was that the use of racial
classifications "may ... reinforce common stereotypes holding that
certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection
based on a factor having no relationship to individual worth."' '- This has
been a common harm mentioned by a number of Supreme Court
Justices. Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena," called this "racial paternalism.""'
According to Thomas, "racial paternalism and its unintended
consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of
discrimination. [It] ... teaches many that because of chronic and
apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them
without their patronizing indulgence."" Justice O'Connor's opinion, in
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.."' noted that "[c]lassifications
based on race carry a danger of stigmatic har..... Mhey may in fact
promote notions of racial inferiority.""' Thus, the use of racial
classifications can stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority.
A number of Supreme Court Justices have pointed to the harm of
racial hostility that can be caused by the use of racial classifications.
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson noted that classifications based on
race "may in fact ... lead to a politics of racial hostility. ''A In Shaw i.
Reno, 59 a majority of the Court stated that racial and ethnic
classifications have a tendency to "stigmatize individuals," polarize
society, and "incite racial hostilit[ies]. ' Sv7
The use of racial classifications can also create the abstract harm of
a denial of individuality. In Miller v. Jolnson,"' the Court addressed a
challenge to the racially motivated Georgia congressional redistricting
plan."9 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, responded to one
argument made by the plan's defenders:
589. Id.
590. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
591. Id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring).
592. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
593. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
594. Id. at 493.
595. Id.
596. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
597. Id. at 643.
598. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). The Court addressed the intentional creation of a third majority-
minority congressional district by Georgia at the behest of the Department of Justice. See id. at 906-
07. The Department of Justice had interpreted the Voting Rights Act to require that states under its
supervision maximize the number of minority representatives. See id. at 907. Pursuant to demands
by the Department of Justice, Georgia intentionally redrew its congressional districts to assure the
creation of three majority-minority districts. See id.
599. Seeid.at910.
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the Equal Protection Clause's general proscription on race-based
decisionmaking does not obtain in the districting context because
redistricting by definition involves racial considerations. Underlying
their argument are the very stereotypical assumptions the Equal
Protection Clause forbids. It is true that redistricting in most cases will
implicate a political calculus in which various interests compete for
recognition, but it does not follow from this that individuals of the
same race share a single political interest. The view that they do is
"based on the demeaning notion that members of the defined racial
groups ascribe to certain 'minority views' that must be different from
those of other citizens," the precise use of race as a proxy the
Constitution prohibits.6
Kennedy goes on to state that "[r]ace-based assignments 'embody
stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race, evaluating
their thoughts and efforts-their very worth as citizens-according to a
criterion barred to the Government by history and the Constitution. ' '' 6 '
Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Croson stated that:
The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as
nothing compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society
the source of those effects, which is the tendency-fatal to a Nation
such as ours-to classify and judge men and women on the basis of
their country of origin or the color of their skin.6
In Adarand, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, stated that persons
disadvantaged by such racial or ethnic categorizations necessarily suffer
a cognizable injury.6
The harms derived from governmental use of racial classifications
are that the interest of the individual is sacrificed for the benefit of their
racial or ethnic group, innocent persons bear the burden of redressing
grievances that they did not cause, individuals are stigmatized as being
inflicted with the immutable generation of racial and ethnic hostility, and
individuals are demeaned because their thoughts and efforts are
evaluated as a product of their race or ethnicity. From these harms, it is
apparent that the overriding value embedded in the Equal Protection
Clause is the importance of treating people as individuals. All of the
potential harms that occur from racial classifications occur because of
government's failure to respect a person's individuality. The core value
600. Id. at 914 (citation omitted) (quoting Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
601. Id. at 912 (quoting Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
602. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,520 (1989) (Scalia, ., concurring).
603. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,229-30 (1995).
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that comes from the Equal Protection Clause that should be inculcated
by public elementary and secondary schools is the importance of
respecting and recognizing everyone as an individual, rather than as a
member of their racial or ethnic group.
B. The Value of Respecting Individuality that Should
Be Inculcated by Public Elementary and
Secondary Schools
The Supreme Court's primary way of resolving racial and ethnic
issues is by viewing American society as a collection of "Knowing
Individuals" as distinguished from minors."
Much of the Supreme Court's rhetoric on the harm of governmental
racial classifications contained in the controlling opinions in cases like
Bakke, Wygant, Croson, [ShawI Miller and Adarand, rests upon the
idea of furthering the self-determination of [K]nowing [I]ndividuals.
Knowing [I]ndividuals are viewed as rational, autonomous, self-
generating, and free-willed people who are capable of pursuing their
self-formulated goals and objectives.6"
To maximize the ability of "Knowing Individuals" to be self-
determined, they must also "exercise self-restraint over their inclinations
that would, if satisfied, directly interfere or create a substantial risk of
interference with [their fellow Knowing Individuals'] ability to pursue
their goals and objectives.""" Living in a society that provides people
with the freedom to pursue their own goals and objectives, requires the
imposition of a burden that restrains such freedom so as not to interfere
with the right of others to do the same.67 Thus, "Knowing Individuals"
"have an interest in their fellow citizens developing the values that will
allow them to be self-determining. Toleration ... for those who ...
[pursue different goals and objectives] provides as fundamental a core
set of values as does the right of self-determination."
Respect for the right of the self-determination of "Knowing
Individuals" does not lead to the abolition of racial and ethnic
differences. "Even though [K]nowing [I]ndividuals should not be
604. See BARBARA SENKOWSKi STENGEL, JUST EDuCATION: THE RIGHT To EDUCATON4 C4
CONTEXTAND CONVERSATION 101 (1991).
605. Kevin Brown, The Implications of the Equal Protection Clause for the Mandato
Integration of Public School Students, 29 CONN. L REv. 999, 1021 (1997).
606. Id. at 1024.
607. See id.
608. Id. at 1038.
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compelled to view themselves as members of their racial and ethnic
group, they must be allowed" the freedom "to choose to celebrate their
racial or ethnic [connections and] heritage[s]."'  If a "Knowing
Individual" is treated as a member of his or her race or ethnicity against
his or her will, it is clear that their individuality is not being respected.61
"Knowing Individuals" will choose to make their racial or ethnic
identity a salient part of their individuality and to celebrate their racial or
ethnic heritage.6 ' In order to respect their individuality, it is necessary to
respect their choices to celebrate their racial or ethnic heritage."2 "As
contradictory as it sounds," the notion of respecting the rights of
individuals to be self-determining does not lead to an abolition of racial
or ethnic distinctions.63 Rather, involuntary affiliations derived from
race or ethnicity should be treated as matters of personal preference on
the same level of voluntariness that we associate with political,
associational, or other lifestyle choices.614
When "Knowing Individuals" choose to make their race or
ethnicity a salient part of their identity or celebrate their racial or ethnic
heritage, recognizing them as a member of their racial or ethnic group
does not deny their individuality.6"5 To deny the importance of their race
or ethnicity at these times would be to disrespect their individual
choice.6 6 If "Knowing Individuals" choose to sacrifice their individual
interest for the interest of their racial or ethnic group, that does not deny
their individuality either. Rather, that also respects the choice that this
particular "Knowing Individual" has made.6
A necessary aspect of respecting individuality regarding race and
ethnicity is the need for others to tolerate their choices.1 8 Just as with
chosen political affiliations, associational memberships, or other life
style choices, others do not have to condone or agree with the choice by
a given person to celebrate their racial or ethnic heritage or make it an
important aspect of their individuality. They simply have to respect that
person's choice enough not to unduly interfere with it.
609. Id. at 1022-23.
610. See id. at 1022.
611. Seeid. at1024.
612. See id. at 1024-25.
613. See id. at 1023 (emphasis added).
614. See id.
615. See id. at 1024-25.
616. See id.
617. See id.
618. See id. at 1037-39.
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C. How the Use of Racial and Ethnic Classifications to
Pronote Integrated Student Bodies Advances the
Values Related to Respecting Individuality
"When government action affects the rights of adults, it is affecting
the right of people who are generally presumed to be capable of
exercising the capacity for free choice.... Children in public schools,
however, are learners not choosers."'" 9
Public education is the one place where government is suppose to be
actively involved in the socialization of the next generation of adult
citizens. In the institution of public education, government exerts a
tremendous influence on learners in order to produce the kind of
choosers that possess the values necessary for the maintenance of our
democratic society.":"
The learner must acquire the knowledge of how to become a self-
determining chooser.6' "But equally important is the need for learners to
learn to constrain their choices in order to allow others the same right of
self-determination. Thus, schools must strive to further the values of
[independence] and toleration. They must both advance and constrain
[self-determination] at the same time."2 This process of socialization
requires that government stress two inconsistent sets of belief. Education
must increase the capacity of minors to determine and choose what is
best for themselves. At the same time, education must constrain certain
choices that individuals choose in order to allow others to pursue their
own self-determined goals and objectives.
All arguments for integrated education start with the unproblematic
assumption that race and ethnicity in American society still matters. If
we were truly a color-blind society where the color of one's skin was
analogous to the color of one's eyes, then there would be no possible
justification for taking account of race and ethnicity in order to integrate
public schools. Such a decision would clearly be as irrational as
separating brown-eyed children from blue-eyed and green-eyed
children--especially in the age of the colored contact lens.
A number of lower federal courts that have recently addressed the
use of racial classifications for the purpose of obtaining an integrated
student body have commented on the irony that, in an effort to teach
students to see themselves and others as individuals, it is necessary to
619. Id. at 1032.
620. Id. at 1025.
621. Seeid.at1032.
622. Id.
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classify them as members of racial and ethnic groups.613 But it is equally
ironic and contradictory to expect that an Asian child going to school
with only other Asians, a black child going to school with only other
blacks, a Latino child going to school with only other Latinos, or a white
child going to school with only other whites will come to see people
from different racial or ethnic groups as individuals, rather than as
members of their various racial or ethnic groups. In racially isolated
schools, education officials face a situation where their ability to teach
students the values of respecting everyone's individuality will be
difficult, if not impossible. As Justice Blackmun noted in his opinion in
Bakke, sometimes "[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take
account of race." 624 This is particularly true in public elementary and
secondary education.
Justifications for the use of racial classifications to promote
integrated education can be positive.- In this sense, the justifications
extol the ability of integrated education to increase the capacity and
ability of minors to be able to choose what is best for themselves.
626
Justifications can also be negative.627 In this sense, arguments for the use
of racial classifications to promote integrated education point out their
ability to constrain certain choices as to reduce undue interference with
the choices of others.62
"Exposing [students] to those from diverse racial and ethnic
backgrounds" provides all of them with a broader and richer educational
experience.629 Through interaction with students from different racial and
ethnic backgrounds, all students are more likely to be exposed to
different types of music, movies, television programs, dress,
entertainment, and foods. A racially and ethnically diverse student body
increases the atmosphere of speculation and experimentation for all
students, which can help "to expand their knowledge, broaden their
sensibilities, kindle their imagination, foster a spirit of free inquiry, and
increase their human understanding." 630 This broader and richer
educational experience provides students with information from which
to draw upon in order to determine what is best for themselves.
623. See, e.g., Tito v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., No. 97-540-A, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7932,
at *15 (E.D. Va. May 13, 1997).
624. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blacknun, J., concurring).
625. See Brown, supra note 605, at 1036.
626. See id. at 1037.
627. See id. at 1036.
628. See id. at 1037.
629. Id. at 1039.
630. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239 (1972) (White J., concurring).
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Many people continue to judge others with reference to stereotypes
attached to their skin color. When people act towards others based upon
stereotypes, they deny that person his or her individuality and interfere
with his or her ability to be self-determining."" Rather than have his or
her individual personality traits and characteristics recognized, they are
presumed to correspond with those normally attached to his or her skin
color. 632 Integrated education can help to overcome racial and ethnic
stereotyping.33 To move beyond attaching significance to skin color, it is
necessary for children to come together at a time when their attitudes
about people from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds are in the
process of forming. By getting to know people from different racial and
ethnic groups, children can come to see others as individuals, rather than
as members of racial and ethnic groups.6
Some blacks, whites, Asians, and Latinos %vill-at least at certain
times---choose to celebrate their racial or ethnic heritage, make it a
salient part of their individual identity, or choose to associate primarily
with others who share their racial or ethnic backgrounds. 65 Others,
however, will find none of this personally appealing. By exposing
students to those from different racial and ethnic backgrounds, all
students have an opportunity to see that individuals who do not share
their racial or ethnic background make their own choice regarding
whether to celebrate their racial or ethnic heritage, make that heritage an
important part of their individual identity, or associate primarily with
members of their own race or ethnicity. '3 In other words, white students
are provided the opportunity to observe that not all blacks attach a
particular importance to being African American or associating
primarily with other blacks. And black students will see that not all
white students attach a particular importance to being Caucasians or
associating primarily with other whites. Thus, the students have an
opportunity to observe firsthand the fact that the importance of race and
ethnic affiliation depends upon individual choices.
Integrated education also allows students to see that members of
their own racial or ethnic group can choose to primarily associate with
racial or ethnic group members or non-group members. 37 Thus, African
631. See Brown, supra note 605, at 1036.
632. See id.
633. See id. at 1037, 1039.
634. See id.
635. See id. at 1023-24, 1038.
636. See id. at 1022, 1024.
637. See id. at 1022-23, 1038-39.
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American students will see other black students choose to associate
primarily with other blacks as well as black students who choose
primarily to associate with non-blacks. White students will get to see
other white students who associate primarily with other whites as well as
white students who primarily associate with non-whites. This provides
all students with an understanding that they have some control over
whether they primarily associate with members of their own racial or
ethnic group.
Integrated student bodies provide students with a better opportunity
to learn tolerance for racial and ethnic differences. 638 For those who
choose to make their race and ethnicity a significant part of their
individuality, they need to be able to make such choices without having
their desires unduly infringed upon by others. Thus, integrated education
exposes students to people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds
who may choose to celebrate their racial or ethnic heritage, or make their
race or ethnicity a salient part of their identity.
D. Conclusion
From the perspective of the special environment of public
education, the use of racial classifications to segregate students, teachers,
staff, and administrators along racial and ethnic lines clearly violated the
Equal Protection Clause. The primary message of de jure segregation
was the stigmatic message that blacks and other minorities were inferior
to whites.639 Thus, the values being inculcated by public schools engaged
in de jure segregation were a clear rejection of the importance of
respecting and recognizing everyone as an individual.
The use of racial classifications to foster integration to remedy de
jure segregation, however, advanced the values of respecting and
recognizing everyone as an individual. For the federal courts, the reason
to integrate schools was to teach racial and ethnic equality. ""
Compelling public schools that believed in the inferiority of minorities
to mix racial and ethnic groups carried the message of equality of all.
Thus, using racial classifications to integrate public schools promoted
respect for and recognition of everyone as an individual.
638. See id. at 1038.
639. For a detailed analysis of this, see Brown, supra note 411.
640. I believe that the federal courts employing desegregation remedies believed that they were
advancing a belief in racial and ethnic equality. I have argued and continue to believe and assert that
the Supreme Court opinions justifying desegregation carried a stigmatic message of black
inferiority. See Brown, supra note 548, at 35-37.
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While it is true that race and ethnicity matter less today than in
earlier decades, the use of racial classifications to promote integration
still carries a message of respecting and recognizing everyone as an
individual. This is particularly true where the measures adopted by
schools are voluntary." When public schools use racial classifications to
foster voluntary integrated student bodies, the only people who are
affected are individuals who choose to apply to schools where these
classifications are being used. Thus, if the parents or the student prefer
not to be affected by government use of racial classifications to promote
integrated student bodies, they simply need not apply to the affected
school.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a number of different contexts, Supreme Court opinions have
recognized that constitutional rights must be adapted to the special
nature of public education. Over the past few years a number of federal
courts have addressed equal protection challenges to the use of racial
classifications of students in the admissions policies of public
elementary and secondary schools. The school officials take account of
race and ethnicity in order to foster voluntary integration of their student
bodies. These courts have analyzed the constitutionality of these policies
by applying strict scrutiny. Most of these court decisions concluded that
the school officials failed either to articulate a compelling state interest
to justify their policies, or that their policies were not narrowly tailored.
Their analysis, however, does not take into account the special
environment of public education.
This Article has argued that the recent lower federal court decisions
have not paid adequate attention to the Supreme Court cases in the field
of public elementary and secondary education. It is a mistake to view the
use of racial classifications in public schools the same way that their use
would be viewed outside the context of public education. When courts
address these challenges they should focus on whether the values being
inculcated to the young by the use of racial classifications to foster
integrated student bodies are consistent with those derived from the
Equal Protection Clause. In terms of strict scrutiny, public schools have
a compelling state interest in inculcating the values derived from the
Equal Protection Clause, and using racial classifications in an effort to
641. I have, however, contended that mandatory measures %ould also be consistent %ith the
Equal Protection Clause. See Brown, supra note 605, at 1041.
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promote voluntary integration may be narrowly tailored to advance such
an interest.
A number of different Supreme Court opinions have addressed
harms derived by governmental use of racial classifications in a non-
public education context. All of the potential harms that occur from the
use of racial classifications occur because of government's failure to
respect individuality. The core values that come from the Equal
Protection Clause that should be inculcated by public elementary and
secondary schools is the importance of respecting and recognizing
everyone as an individual, not as a member of their racial or ethnic
group.
During the 1960s and 1970s, it is easy to see how using racial
classifications to foster integrated schools would have furthered respect
for individuality. The main question is, now that we are in the twenty-
first century, have conditions in America changed to such an extent that
the use of racial classifications to foster integrated education actually
retards the appreciation and understanding that persons should be treated
as individuals? Students are more likely to learn to treat members from
racial and ethnic backgrounds different from their own as individuals if
they attend integrated schools than if they attend racially isolated
schools. If state and school officials make it very clear that their purpose
of taking account of race and ethnicity to produce integrated student
bodies is not for the purpose of cultural pluralism, but for the purpose of
individual self-determination, then there should be no equal protection
concern.
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